Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law by Lovett, John A.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 78 | Number 4
Spring 2018
Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law
John A. Lovett
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
John A. Lovett, Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law, 78 La. L. Rev. (2018)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol78/iss4/11
  
Good Faith in Louisiana Property Law             
Dedicated to A.N. Yiannopoulos 
John A. Lovett** 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Introduction ................................................................................ 1163 
I. Encroaching Buildings: Article 670 ........................................... 1172 
II. Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine .................................................. 1179 
 A. Lost or Stolen Things ........................................................... 1182 
 B. Annullable Title ................................................................... 1187 
 C. The Double Sale .................................................................. 1189 
 D. The Faithless Pledgee, Lessee, or Depositary ...................... 1193 
III. Accession ................................................................................... 1200 
IV. Acquisitive Prescription with Respect to Immovables ............... 1210 
 Conclusion: Property Law Without Good Faith ......................... 1218 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of good faith is a cornerstone of Louisiana private law. It 
plays a central role in the law of general and conventional obligations.1 It 
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makes crucial appearances in the law of sales.2 It even affects subjects in 
the law of persons, such as the civil effects of absolutely null and putative 
marriages.3 
But good faith is also a pivotal concept in Louisiana property law. 
Although it has always been a feature of that law, during an intense burst 
of law reform activity stretching from 1977 to 1982, the Louisiana 
Legislature (“Legislature”) updated and extended the concept of good faith 
in several core areas of property law.4  
                                                                                                             
 1. In the context of general and conventional obligations, all obligors and 
obligees must conduct themselves in accordance with the general duty of good faith. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1759, 1770, 1983 (2018). An obligor in good faith who 
breaches a conventional obligation is liable only for foreseeable damages, but an 
obligor in bad faith can be liable for unforeseeable damages as long as those 
damages directly resulted from his failure to perform. Id. arts. 1996–97. Other 
provisions that employ good faith in the law of obligations include Louisiana Civil 
Code article 1975 (“[O]utput or requirements must be measured in good faith.”); 
article 2021 (“Dissolution of a contract does not impair the rights acquired through 
an onerous contract by a third party in good faith.”); article 2028 (“Counterletters 
can have no effects against third persons in good faith.”); and article 2035 (“Nullity 
of a contract does not impair the rights acquired through an onerous contract by a 
third party in good faith.”). For a detailed meditation on the role of good faith in the 
law of obligations, see Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (1997). 
 2. Although the Louisiana Civil Code provisions in the chapter on sales do 
not specifically use the term “good faith” in the text of the articles, revision 
comments repeatedly distinguish between good faith and bad faith sellers. See, e.g., 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2534 cmt. a (noting that the article “changes the law . . . by 
extending the prescriptive period for actions in redhibition against a seller in good 
faith from one to four years . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. art. 2545 cmt. b (describing 
a manufacturer as being “deemed to be in bad faith” regardless of his actual 
knowledge of the thing sold); art. 2545 cmt. f (noting that a buyer is not required to 
give “a bad faith seller or a manufacturer” an opportunity to repair before instituting 
an action in redhibition); art. 2545 cmt. g (referring to a potential credit a “bad faith 
seller” can claim for use of thing in an action of redhibition). 
 3. Id. art. 96. 
 4. Through his leadership role with the Louisiana State Law Institute in the 
revision of the Louisiana Civil Code and as the most widely cited and influential 
commentator on Louisiana law, Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos significantly 
influenced the development of good faith in Louisiana property law. See generally 
Justice Harry T. Lemmon, A Tribute to Athanasios N. Yiannopoulos, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 1025 (1997); Tyler G. Storms, Interview with Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos: 
Louisiana’s Most Influential Jurist in Our Time, 64 LA. BAR. J., June–July 2016, 
at 24, 27 n.6 (listing the numerous Law Institute Committees for which Professor 
Yiannopoulos served as reporter). It is fitting, then, that this Article contributes to 
the current issue of the Louisiana Law Review published in his honor. 




This Article addresses the role of good faith in four of those distinct 
areas: (1) as a prerequisite to the establishment of a predial servitude 
benefiting the owner of a building that encroaches on the property of a 
neighbor;5 (2) as a mediating device allocating the rights of an original 
owner of a corporeal movable and a subsequent acquirer under the bona fide 
purchaser doctrine;6 (3) as a defining characteristic establishing rights and 
obligations under the law of accession when a person possesses immovable 
property without a valid title;7 and (4) as a prerequisite for the acquisition of 
ownership of, or other real rights in, immovable property by ten-year 
acquisitive prescription.8 Although this Article notes the sources of good 
faith in Louisiana jurisprudence, prior Louisiana civil codes, and European 
civil codes considered in the revision process, it focuses primarily on how 
good faith has functioned in the post-revision property law landscape. It 
does so by examining the text and structure of the good faith provisions in 
the continuous revised Civil Code and reported judicial decisions that have 
employed the new or reformulated definitions of good faith. 
Within the parameters of property law that are the focus of this Article,9 
an owner of a corporeal thing experiences a loss of property rights in some 
form or another. In the case of encroaching buildings, the servient estate 
owner may be forced to relinquish a predial servitude over his immovable 
property if the encroaching building owner is in good faith.10 In the case of 
a lost or stolen corporeal movable, the owner must compensate a subsequent 
acquirer before the owner can recover possession if the acquirer purchased 
                                                                                                             
 5. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670. 
 6. Id. arts. 518–25. 
 7. Id. art. 487. 
 8. Id. arts. 3475, 3480–82. The Louisiana Civil Code also provides that a 
possessor can acquire ownership of or other real rights in a movable through 
acquisitive prescription after three years of possession with good faith and an act 
sufficient to transfer ownership, but she must possess for ten years in the absence of 
good faith or title to acquire ownership by prescription. Id. arts. 3489–91. Cases 
applying these articles are discussed briefly infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 9. Good faith also plays a quiet but significant role in the shadows of 
Louisiana’s public records doctrine. See, e.g., Longleaf Invs., L.L.C. v. Tolintino, 
108 So. 3d 157, 159–61 (La. App. Cir. 2012) (holding that a party who would 
otherwise be a third party purchaser under Article 3338 of the Civil Code cannot 
rely on the public records doctrine when there are indications of bad faith and 
fraud). Consideration of good faith in the public records doctrine, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. For more on this topic, see generally Michael 
Palestina, Comment, Of Registry: Louisiana’s Revised Public Records Doctrine, 
53 LOY. L. REV. 899 (2007). 
 10. Art. 670. 




the corporeal movable in good faith.11 In other situations covered by the 
bona fide purchaser doctrine, the original owner of a corporeal movable 
thing will lose all of his property rights in a corporeal movable he once 
owned and cannot revendicate the thing if the acquirer takes possession in 
good faith from a particular kind of intermediary.12 In accession, the owner 
of immovable property must sometimes compensate another person who 
enters his immovable without permission and improves it, derives natural 
or civil fruits from it, or even depletes it of some of its actual substance, if 
that other person is a good faith possessor.13 Finally, under the law of 
acquisitive prescription, the original owner of an immovable will lose all 
or a portion of her property rights to another person who has intruded on 
the owner’s sphere of exclusive control if the intruder took possession 
pursuant to a just title and was in good faith at the time of the intrusion.14  
In all four of these situations, the Louisiana Civil Code shifts a property 
law entitlement from the original owner to someone who ordinarily would not 
be entitled to any legal protection.15 In each of these instances, the concept of 
good faith serves as a crucial mediating device, reallocating the rights and 
obligations of the original owner and the new player who has arrived on the 
scene either uninvited or through some intermediate transaction.  
This Article suggests that the concept of good faith has two components 
in the context of property law.16 One component concerns honesty. A person 
                                                                                                             
 11. See id. arts. 523–24, discussed infra Part II.A. 
 12. This is true in cases involving annullable title, double dealers, and faithless 
trustees. See id. arts. 518, 520 (repealed), 522, 525, discussed infra Parts III.B–D. 
 13. See id. arts. 483–89, 496–97, 527–29, discussed infra Part IV. 
 14. This is the case with encroaching building servitudes, art. 670, discussed 
infra Part II, and ten-year acquisitive prescription of immovables. Id. arts. 3475, 
3480–82, discussed infra Part V. 
 15. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1 (2002); John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in 
the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lovett, A Bend in the Road]. 
 16. Professor Litvinoff likewise suggested that good faith has two 
components, which he described as “a psychological and an ethical component.” 
Litvinoff, supra note 1, at 1649. “The former,” he said,  
would consist of a belief that one is acting according to law, and is 
designated as a good faith-belief. The latter would consist in conducting 
oneself according to moral standards, and is designated as good faith-
probity, or good faith-honesty, and is germane to ideas of loyalty and 
respect for the pledged word. 




acts in good faith in the property law context when he honestly believes he 
is the rightful owner of the thing he is possessing or honestly believes that 
his ownership extends to all the land that his improvements are occupying. 
Honesty is the fundamental requirement of a good faith actor in property 
law. If someone knows that he is not the rightful owner of land or of a 
corporeal movable, that he has no lawful basis upon which to rest his 
occupation or possession, or that his improvements extend beyond the actual 
limits of his ownership, he necessarily is a bad faith possessor. 
The second component of good faith in Louisiana property law is 
carefulness. A good faith actor in property law is someone who not only 
honestly believes he is the owner or rightful occupier of the thing at issue, but 
he also was at least minimally careful when he built an improvement or took 
possession of a corporeal movable or immovable. Unlike honesty, however, 
carefulness is a relative criterion. The standard of carefulness varies quite 
considerably in the four situations studied in this Article. In some instances, 
the presumption of good faith protects the good faith claimant by only 
requiring that she not ignore obvious red flags.17 In other cases, the nature of 
the marketplace can insulate an acquirer and entitle her to presume a vendor 
has title unless red flags appear or unusual circumstances should alert her to 
the need for greater scrutiny of the vendor’s ownership.18 In other cases, the 
claimant must rely on a written instrument that on its face is translative of 
ownership—for instance, a written act of sale, donation, or exchange—and 
also not be aware of any significant defects in title.19 Finally, in the context of 
acquisitive prescription, the claimant’s reliance on a written act must also be 
reasonable in light of all objective circumstances.20  
In general, then, particularly in the context of encroaching building 
servitudes and accession, good faith works in a relatively simple—though 
not simplistic—crystalline, on-and-off manner.21 In those areas, courts 
                                                                                                             
Id. He also recognized that, often, it is difficult to disentangle these two 
components of good faith, noting that “both can coexist in a person’s conscience” 
and that sometimes it is “just one thing compounded of two ingredients, or a single 
coin with two sides.” Id. at 1650. 
 17. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670, discussed infra Part II. 
 18. See generally id. arts. 518, 521–24, discussed infra Part III. 
 19. See generally id. art. 487, discussed infra Part IV. 
 20. See generally id. art. 3480, discussed infra Part V. 
 21. Infra Parts I, III. For the distinction between crystalline rules and muddy 
standards, see generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 577 (1988). For the utility of mechanistic, on-and-off rules in the linguistic 
economy of property law, see generally Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003). For the author’s views 
on the rules versus standards debate as it plays out in Louisiana, see generally John A. 




employ relatively mechanistic tests to determine whether good faith exists, 
often focusing solely on the claimant’s subjective belief that he was the 
owner of the property involved and his lack of awareness of defects in his 
title.22 In those cases, courts seem to employ an intuitive notion of fairness 
or common morality.23 In short, they focus primarily on the honesty 
component of good faith and worry less about carefulness. 
In the context of the bona fide purchaser doctrine and ten-year 
acquisitive prescription regarding immovables, however, courts employ 
more stylized, complex, and case-specific approaches that consider not only 
the claimant’s subjective belief that he is possessing rightfully but also the 
transactional and objective reasonableness of that belief.24 In these cases, 
honesty remains a prerequisite to good faith status, but carefulness becomes 
a higher priority and attracts more rigorous judicial scrutiny—even though 
good faith is still presumed.  
When Louisiana courts consider the carefulness of the alleged good faith 
actor in property law, they also quite frequently ask questions about the 
relative carelessness of the person who allowed the good faith claimant to 
come into possession of the thing in dispute.25 In this sense, evaluation of one 
party’s alleged good faith in property law usually involves, at least to some 
degree, a relational inquiry. If a court finds someone to be a good faith 
encroacher, acquirer, purchaser, or possessor, usually the other party was not 
particularly careful with the thing he owned. The structure of good faith 
analysis in Louisiana property law thus can be visualized using a simple 
graph. Carefulness forms the horizontal or x-axis, and honesty forms the 
vertical or y-axis. On this graph, all four of the examples of good faith analysis 
studied in this Article—good faith encroachers under Article 670, good faith 
purchasers of corporeal movables, and good faith possessors for purposes of 
                                                                                                             
Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards and Hybrid 
Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923 (2012). 
 22. See generally infra Parts II, IV. 
 23. See Thomas Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (arguing that property as an institution can only 
function well if most people recognize that property is a moral right and if 
property rules correspond with common sense notions of morality). Merrill and 
Smith briefly discuss the subjects of this essay from the common law perspective 
and note the importance of good faith in adverse possession, the good faith 
purchaser doctrine, accession, and building encroachments. Id. at 1874–79. 
 24. See generally infra Parts III, V. 
 25. See cases discussed infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; William 
Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 52 So. 131 (La. 1910) (on rehearing), and La. Lift & Equip. 
Co. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. App. 2000), discussed infra at notes 152–189 
and accompanying text. 




accession and acquisitive prescription—are located at the same point along 
the y-axis, all requiring a foundational level of honesty.  
What differentiates the good faith analyses studied here is their placement 
on the x-axis—that is, the degree of carefulness required. A good faith 
encroacher under Article 670 must demonstrate only a minimal amount of 
carefulness—really nothing more than the absence of outright carelessness.26 A 
good faith possessor for purposes of accession is located somewhat to the right 
of the Article 670 encroacher on the x-axis because she must possess in reliance 
on some act translative of ownership and cannot be aware of any defects in her 
title, but she generally is not subject to a test of objective reasonableness. In 
other words, a good faith possessor for purposes of accession must be honest 
and careful enough that she relied on a written act, but no extra measure of 
carefulness is required. Close by, but somewhat further along the x-axis, is the 
good faith acquirer under the bona fide purchaser doctrine, a person who is 
presumed to be in good faith but might not be rewarded with that status if some 
special circumstances of her acquisition or purchase should make her aware that 
her transferor was not the rightful owner. The would-be good faith acquirer 
under this doctrine often must meet an implied test of objective reasonableness, 
in which market circumstances can weigh heavily for or against good faith 
status. Finally, located at the furthest point on the x-axis is the good faith 
possessor for purposes of acquisitive prescription, a claimant who must rely on 




                                                                                                             
 26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670 (2018). 




Another way to imagine the structure of good faith in Louisiana property 
law is to visualize a sine wave that oscillates above and below a baseline. 
When the level of complexity of the good faith analysis is relatively low—
that is, when honesty and a very minimal level of carefulness is all that is 
required—as in the case of encroaching buildings and accession, the curve 
dips below the baseline. When the level of complexity of the good faith 
analysis is high—that is, when honesty and either implied or explicit objective 
reasonableness is required—as in the case of the good faith purchaser doctrine 
and ten-year prescription of immovables, the curve rises above the baseline.27 
Generally speaking, when the value of the property interest that is subject to 
entitlement shifting rises, as with the bona fide purchase doctrine and ten-year 
acquisitive prescription, the complexity and rigor of good faith analysis 
increases.28 Conversely, when the property interests at stake are more modest, 
as with encroaching buildings and accession, the complexity and rigor of the 




  Bona Fide Purchaser      Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription 
 
Encroaching Buildings Accession 
                                                                                                             
 27. In a true sine wave, the amplitude of the wave, that is, the distance above 
and below the base line, is invariable. In Louisiana property law, the complexity 
and intensity of the good faith analysis will vary from institution to institution. 
 28. The good faith transferee under the bona fide purchase doctrine will either 
be entitled to full reimbursement of the purchase price of the movable in dispute 
or actually acquire ownership, and the good faith possessor under ten-year 
acquisitive prescription will acquire ownership or other real rights of the 
immovable in dispute. See infra Parts II, IV.   
 29. The good faith encroacher will acquire only a predial servitude permitting 
an encroaching building to remain in place and the good faith possessor in 
accession will obtain only ownership of civil or natural fruits or various 
reimbursement rights. See infra Parts I, III. 



























Regardless of how one visualizes the spectrum of good faith analyses 
required under Louisiana property law, good faith is always present. It 
functions like the water running in a navigable river or stream. Sometimes 
the water level runs high. Sometimes it runs low. The surrounding terrain 
may consist of flat rules of exclusion and contract. But the current of good 
faith frequently provides courts with a malleable, lubricating, and decision-
making tool when property rights are subject to sudden transformations.  
Good faith helps courts determine whether a landowner must allow 
room for an innocent encroacher. It helps courts decide whether an original 
owner of a lost or stolen movable must pay a subsequent purchaser to 
reacquire possession or whether an owner of a corporeal movable has 
entirely lost his right to revendicate a movable from a subsequent transferee. 
It determines when an owner must reimburse a possessor for his contribution 
to a thing possessed without the consent of the owner. Finally, and most 
radically, it signals when a possessor of an immovable can acquire 
ownership or other real rights with only ten years of continuous possession.  
In this Article, these strong currents of good faith are traced in the 
order in which the relevant titles of the Civil Code were revised.30 Part I 
addresses the undefined and relatively simple requirement of good faith in 
the acquisition of an encroaching building servitude. Part II analyzes the 
pervasive and more complex decision-making role of good faith in four 
different scenarios encompassed within Louisiana’s version of the bona 
fide purchaser doctrine applicable to the transfer of ownership of 
movables. Part III examines the good/bad faith possessor distinction as a 
rough shorthand, allocative tool in the law of accession as it relates to 
immovables. Part IV focuses on the contextualizing function of good faith 
in ten-year acquisitive prescription in relation to immovables. This Article 
concludes by imagining what Louisiana property would look like if good 
faith considerations were banished. This final, albeit hypothetical, view 
reveals that the continuing presence of good faith in Louisiana property 
law makes the institution of property law more nuanced and ethically 
responsive to common sense notions of morality and, in particular, the 
principle that persons who benefit from rules that shift property 
entitlements should be honest and demonstrate at least a modicum of 
carefulness when they acquire new things or rights.31 
                                                                                                             
 30. By helping to make good faith an explicit, though flexible, prerequisite 
in the case of encroaching buildings and by building upon prior doctrine, 
modernizing and further rationalizing the role of good faith in the other three 
cases, Professor Yiannopoulos deepened the currents of good faith in Louisiana 
property law. 
 31. Merrill & Smith, supra note 23. 




I. ENCROACHING BUILDINGS: ARTICLE 670 
Act 514 of the 1977 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was 
the second of many sweeping acts revising Louisiana property law in the 
1970s.32 Article 670 of the Civil Code appears in the portion of the act 
revising the law of “legal servitudes.”33 It codifies several attempts by 
Louisiana courts to solve a frequently recurring property law problem—a 
building constructed by one property owner that encroaches on the 
property of his neighbor. Article 670 allows for the creation of a predial 
servitude to permit the encroaching building to remain on the neighbor’s 
property when 
a landowner constructs in good faith a building that encroaches on 
an adjacent estate and the owner of that estate [the servient estate 
owner] does not complain within a reasonable time after he knew 
or should have known of the encroachment, or in any event 
complains only after the construction is substantially completed.34 
The servitude, however, does not come for free; the owner of the building, 
the new dominant estate owner, must pay “compensation for the value of 
the servitude taken and for any other damage that the neighbor has 
suffered.”35 Finally, the servitude only comes into existence if a court, 
exercising its discretion, decides to permit the building to remain.36 
Although Article 670 makes acquisition of an encroaching building 
servitude dependent on a showing that the building at issue was 
constructed “in good faith,” the article does not define the term good faith. 
Good faith, however, always formed a crucial but problematic part of prior 
                                                                                                             
 32. Act No. 514, 1977 La. Acts 1309 revised the law of predial servitudes in 
Title IV of Book II of the Civil Code. The previous year, Act No. 103, 1976 La. 
Acts 321 was enacted to revise the law of personal servitudes, including usufruct, 
habitation, and right of use, in Title III of Book II of the Civil Code.  
 33. Legal servitudes, such as the encroaching building servitude arising under 
Article 670, are “limitations on ownership established by law for the benefit of 
the general public or for the benefit of particular persons.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 659 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. art. 670 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. The owner of an encroaching building who acquires a predial 
servitude under Article 670 acquires the servitude for the benefit of his estate, that 
is, the dominant estate upon which most of the encroaching building exists. 
Meanwhile the predial servitude burdens the other estate, the encroached upon or 
servient estate. See id. art. 646 (“A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate 
for the benefit of a dominant estate.”).   
 36. Art. 670. 




caselaw in which courts often struggled with a gap in the Civil Code of 
1870.37 Article 508 of that code gave restitution-based protection to an 
evicted possessor who had constructed “plantations, edifices or works” on 
the land of another person as long as he had “possessed bona fide.”38 
Article 503 of the same code, in turn, defined a “bona fide possessor” as 
someone “who possesses as owner by virtue of an act sufficient in terms 
to transfer property, the defects of which he was ignorant.”39 Two 
problems arose in applying these two articles to encroaching building 
disputes. First, Article 508, the source of current Articles 496 and 497 of 
the Civil Code,40 actually addressed a different situation—a construction 
situated entirely on another person’s property and not a minor 
encroachment. Second, because an encroaching building owner would 
almost never possess a narrow strip of his neighbor’s property occupied 
by his encroaching building by virtue of a title, an encroaching building 
owner could never really be a “bona fide possessor.” 
To remedy this gap in the law, the drafters of Article 670 drew on two 
different groups of sources. First, they borrowed from “continental civil 
codes,”41 some of which incorporate what law and economics scholars 
                                                                                                             
 37. Id. cmt. b. 
 38. Much like current Louisiana Civil Code article 496, Article 508 of the 
1870 Civil Code stated that the record owner could not demolish constructions 
made by a good faith possessor; instead, he must choose “either to reimburse the 
value of the materials and the price of workmanship, or to reimburse a sum equal 
to the enhanced value of the soil.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 508 (1870). 
 39. Id. art. 503. 
 40. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 487 cmt. a (2018). 
 41. Art. 670 cmt. a. Although the revision comment does not mention which 
continental civil codes the drafters had in mind, they likely drew on Italian and 
German, but not French, sources. Article 938 of the Italian Civil Code states: 
If a portion of the adjoining land is occupied in good faith in the 
construction of a building, and the owner of that land does not object 
within three months of the day on which construction began, the court, 
taking account of the circumstances, can attribute the ownership of the 
building and the occupied soil to the builder. The builder is required to 
pay the owner of the soil double the value of the area occupied, as well 
as compensation for damages. 
Codice Civile [C.c.] [Civil Code] art. 938 (2018) (It.) Paragraph 912 of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (“BGB”) [German Civil Code] reads: 
If the owner of the soil in construction of a building has built beyond the 
border line without intention or gross negligence, the neighbor must 
suffer the building unless before or right after the overtaking of the 
borderline he has objected. The neighbor must be compensated with a 
cash rent. 




today call “liability rule” solutions to the problem of encroaching 
buildings.42 These continental civil codes allow the encroaching building 
owner to acquire a property right vis-à-vis the adjoining landowner 
through the use of a liability rule mechanism, that is, by paying a judicially 
determined amount of compensation for either a permanent or temporary 
property right on the adjoining land.43 
                                                                                                             
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] para. 912 (2018). In contrast, 
French law denies the encroaching building owner any relief at all in this situation 
because it considers the encroachment an invasion of the adjoining owner’s property 
rights and because Article 545 of the French Civil Code only allows a compensated 
taking of private property for a public, but not a private, use. These translations and 
insights are taken from UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 137–39, 139 nn.55, 58 (2000). 
 42. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 15, at 1092. Calabresi and Melamed 
famously envisioned two mechanisms for the protection of property entitlements. 
When an entitlement is protected by a “property rule,” it can only be modified, 
transferred, or terminated through a consensual transaction if the price is determined 
by the mutual consent of the parties. When a property entitlement is subject to a 
“liability rule,” however, it can be modified, transferred, or destroyed in exchange 
for an objectively determined price, that is, a price set by a court. Lovett, A Bend in 
the Road, supra note 15, at 9–10. For example, when the state exercises its power 
of eminent domain and takes a person’s property in exchange for just compensation, 
the condemnee’s property is protected only by a liability rule. See Lovett, A Bend 
in the Road, supra note 15, at 10–16, for a more detailed explanation of the property 
rule-liability rule paradigm. Article 670 of the Civil Code similarly allows the 
encroaching building owner to acquire a predial servitude on the adjoining land and 
the adjoining landowner is compensated by an amount determined objectively by 
the court. Art. 670. 
 43. In terms of economic efficiency, Mattei ranks the German solution to the 
encroaching building problem, along with the English, as the most efficient, 
followed in descending order by the Italian rule, the United States rule, and the 
French rule. MATTEI, supra note 41, at 140. Thus, by blending the German and 
Italian solutions in Article 670’s liability rule solution, Professor Yiannopoulos 
aligned Louisiana with the most advanced civilian legal reasoning, at least 
according to Mattei. In England, as Mattei explains, “the problem is handled either 
by means of estoppel or by refusing the injunction despite the fact that good faith 
does not excuse trespass.” Id. at 137. For an insightful discussion of the approach of 
United States courts to this problem, see THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, 
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 57–60 (2d ed. 2012). Merrill and Smith opine 
that in most United States jurisdictions, if faced with “an unintentional 
encroachment, only slight damage to the plaintiff’s [adjoining landowner’s] interest, 
and grave hardship to the defendant if removal of the encroachment were required, 
most American courts today would probably deny injunctive relief and only award 
damages.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra, at 57. Functionally, this solution is the same 
as provided in Article 670. Merrill and Smith describe a “person who violates 




Second, the drafters acknowledged that in several Louisiana cases, 
courts had allowed encroaching walls “built in good faith and with the 
acquiescence of the adjoining landowner” to remain on a neighbor’s 
property.44 Article 670, however, does not convey much about what good 
faith means in this context. For example, it does not instruct whether a 
property owner must conduct a survey to ascertain the actual boundaries of 
his property before construction begins. It does not indicate whether good 
faith is presumed if the construction took place under a previous owner. It 
does not even explain whether good faith is measured in subjective or 
objective terms. In short, Article 670 provides no guidance about the degree 
of carefulness that an Article 670 claimant must demonstrate to qualify as a 
good faith encroacher. It appears to require nothing more than some base 
level of honesty and perhaps the absence of utter recklessness. 
Happily, though, the vagueness of “good faith” in Article 670 has not 
proven to be a terrible problem, as judicial decisions handed down after its 
adoption have filled in a number of these gaps and, perhaps with one 
notable exception, produced sensible results. In Bushnell v. Artis, for 
instance, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal refused to interpret 
the good faith requirement of Article 670 in light of Article 487, which 
now defines good faith for purposes of accession and requires possession 
by virtue of an act translative of ownership.45 Instead, it found that the 
claimant satisfied the good faith requirement because she always thought 
her property line extended to a fence constructed by a neighbor.46 Further, 
the court implicitly and quickly determined that the claimant’s belief was 
not wholly unreasonable—the claimant had no reason to be aware that the 
neighbor had mistakenly offset the fence from the actual boundary line 
and the neighbor never complained when the claimant constructed her 
home in a 15 foot strip of land apparently made available by the misplaced 
fence.47 In short, the claimant in Bushnell encroached in good faith even 
                                                                                                             
another’s property rights without knowing that he or she is doing so as a ‘good 
faith’ violator” and “someone who knowingly violates another’s property rights” 
as a “‘bad faith’ violator.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra, at 58. 
 44. Art. 670 cmt. c. In Pokoroy v. Pratt, 34 So. 706, 707 (La. 1903), the court 
stressed the acquiescence of the adjoining landowner who sought to have the 
encroaching wall demolished, without discussing the builder’s good or bad faith. 
In Morehead v. Smith, 225 So. 2d 729, 731, 735 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (on 
rehearing), the court easily found that the defendant property owner constructed 
a building with an encroaching wall in good faith because he had acted in 
accordance with a survey performed by a registered surveyor.  
 45. Bushnell v. Artis, 445 So. 2d 152, 154 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  




though she lacked an act translative of ownership describing the occupied 
land and never conducted a survey before commencing construction.48 The 
court essentially presumed that her encroachment was honest and did not 
inquire deeply into her carefulness. 
In a later case, Antis v. Miller, the same appellate court, citing Bushnell, 
reached a similar result but went further in clarifying the relevant factors in 
an Article 670 good faith analysis.49 In Antis, the court held that the 
defendant was entitled to an Article 670 servitude with respect to a 3.85-foot 
strip of land upon which he accidentally built a garage in the absence of a 
pre-construction survey.50 The court determined specifically that the 
defendant was in good faith because (1) he and his ancestors had mowed 
and otherwise maintained the strip of land in controversy, (2) a row of pine 
trees had created the impression that the boundary was further away, and (3) 
the defendant always believed his property extended to the pine trees.51 
Significantly, the court refused to require a survey for good faith encroacher 
status, observing that “[i]f a prior survey . . . were a requisite for good faith, 
there would be no need for Article 670” because “if all constructions were 
preceded by an accurate survey, there would never be an encroachment.”52 
In short, good faith here turns on simple subjective honesty and a modest 
degree of carefulness in the circumstances.  
In Winingder v. Balmer, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
resolved another question when it affirmed the trial court’s implicit finding 
of good faith on the part of a New Orleans homeowner claiming an Article 
670 servitude.53 In that case, the court held that the claimant satisfied the 
good faith requirement in light of two significant facts: (1) the encroaching 
house had been constructed more than 80 years prior to the litigation; and 
(2) the defendant whose property suffered the encroachment actually knew 
about the problem at the time she purchased her property.54 In other words, 
when the encroachment precedes the claimant’s acquisition of the 
property, the court will presume the encroachment occurred in good faith 
                                                                                                             
 48. See id. 
 49. Antis v. Miller, 524 So. 2d 71 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 50. Id. at 76–77. In Antis, the defendant became aware that his garage likely 
encroached on his neighbor’s property after approximately 80% of the 
construction was complete, at which point he notified his neighbor. Id. at 73. 
 51. Id. at 72–73, 76. 
 52. Id. at 76. 
 53. Winingder v. Balmer, 632 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 54. Id. at 410, 413. 




and implicitly charge the servient estate owner with constructive 
knowledge of the encroachment.55 
Following Winingder, another Louisiana appellate court held that a 
neighbor who rebuilt an existing boathouse and pier in the same place as 
a previous owner resulting in a 4.5 feet encroachment across the boundary 
line was similarly entitled to an Article 670 servitude.56 The court justified 
this conclusion by observing that the encroachment pre-dated the servient 
estate’s acquisition of the adjacent lake bottom and by noting that the 
encroacher was unaware that his structures crossed the boundary line.57 
On the other hand, as the court in Ensenat v. Edgecombe observed, a 
property owner who constructs his encroaching driveway and fence in the 
midst of a hotly litigated boundary dispute with his neighbor and, 
moreover, does so while his neighbor is out of town, is barred from any 
relief under Article 670.58 As the circumstances in Ensenat suggest, a 
fundamentally dishonest or mischievous claimant will not be considered a 
good faith encroacher. 
Finally, in Hayes v. Gunn, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal 
confronted a simple factual scenario that nevertheless divided the court 
and revealed that Article 670 does not always produce tidy outcomes.59 In 
that case, a woman acquired two adjoining lots and then transferred one of 
the lots to her daughter and son-in-law, the eventual plaintiffs, who built a 
“covered carport” on the woman’s remaining lot because they did not have 
sufficient room on their own lot.60 The woman gave her daughter and son-
in-law oral permission to construct the carport and use part of her lot as a 
driveway.61 Later, a bank acquired the woman’s remaining lot, which was 
then purchased by another person, the defendant Gunn, who demanded the 
daughter and son-in-law stop using the driveway and remove the carport.62 
In response, the son-in-law filed suit, claiming the acquisition of an Article 
670 servitude with respect to the carport and driveway.63 The trial court 
rejected the claim of an Article 670 servitude, relying on the public records 
                                                                                                             
 55. The court in Winingder also cited Bushnell for the proposition that a 
claimant under Article 670 is “not required to prove that she is a possessor in good 
faith as defined in Louisiana Civil Code article 487.” Id. at 413–14. 
 56. Atwood v. Hylan, 685 So. 2d 450, 450–53 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 57. Id.  
 58. See Ensenat v. Edgecombe, 677 So. 2d 138, 144 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 59. Hayes v. Gunn, 115 So. 3d 1141 (La. Ct. App. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 1142. 
 61. Id. at 1142–43. 
 62. Id. at 1143. 
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doctrine.64 The court of appeal, in a split decision, affirmed, holding that 
the plaintiff did not obtain an Article 670 servitude because he and his wife 
had constructed the carport with the explicit permission of the original 
owner.65  
There are a few problems with this decision. First, it is not clear that 
Article 670 should have been applicable to a covered carport or driveway 
as neither structure is obviously a building.66 Second, although the plaintiff 
and his wife clearly knew they had no ownership interest on the adjacent 
lot when they constructed the carport and driveway and lacked any act 
translative of ownership to the adjoining lot, it is not clear that this fact 
alone should disqualify them from claiming good faith for purposes of 
Article 670. Here, the majority decision conflates one of the key 
requirements of Article 487 of the Civil Code—that a good faith possessor 
have an act translative of ownership—with Article 670 in its determination 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a servitude.67  
In her astute dissent in Hayes, Judge Cooks pointed out that in 
previous decisions the Third Circuit Court of Appeal had rejected the 
notion that an Article 670 claimant must possess by an act translative of 
ownership and further observed that “[t]here is no good faith bright line 
test solely dependent on an act translative of title when applying Article 
670.”68 Moreover, she noticed that Article 670 contemplates “good faith 
in fact” and implicates “honesty” or “lawfulness of purpose.”69 She 
concluded by arguing that the eventual purchaser in Hayes should not have 
been permitted to rely on the fact that the encroaching party’s interest in 
the constructions was unrecorded because Article 670 is designed to 
protect just such interests.70 After all, she notes, the plaintiff and his wife 
“are exactly the type of landowners who, in good faith, construct a 
building that encroaches on the neighboring land to which no objection is 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. at 1144. 
 65. Id. at 1146–47. 
 66. At best, they might be classified as “other constructions permanently 
attached to the ground.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 643 (2018). For examples of 
such constructions, see id. rev. cmt c. This is not the only instance in which 
Louisiana courts have applied Article 670 to structures that are more accurately 
characterized as other constructions rather than buildings. See SGC Land, L.L.C. 
v. La. Mid-Stream Gas Servs., 939 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (W.D. La. 2013) 
(applying Article 670 to a pipeline constructed in good faith); Mary v. QEP 
Energy Co., 2017 WL 6273739, at *12 (W.D. La. Dec. 6, 2017) (same). 
 67. Hayes, 115 So. 3d at 1144–47. 
 68. Id. at 1149 (Cooks, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 




timely made.”71 Admittedly, Hayes is an outlier. The claimant in that case 
built his carport on his neighbor’s property honestly and carefully but was 
not entitled to an Article 670 servitude. Perhaps the best explanation for 
the majority decision is that the majority viewed the plaintiff and his wife 
as precarious possessors and thus not entitled to acquire any property 
rights in the adjoining property.72 
All of these decisions applying Article 670 demonstrate that good faith 
in this context functions in a relatively straightforward, on-and-off 
manner. Rather than engage in complex, highly stylized determinations as 
to whether an owner acted reasonably in light of all the transactional 
circumstances, courts make quick, rough, and ready determinations 
because they are largely focused on the honesty component of good faith 
and specifically whether the claimant knew he was encroaching when he 
started his construction project. It is also true that courts often look at a 
number of objective facts—the presence of fences or other boundary 
markers, the degree of intrusion, the age of the encroachment, and the 
neighbor’s knowledge, for example—to make an assessment about the 
reasonableness of the encroachment, but in the end, their assessments are 
not highly complex. Courts also indulge in a generous presumption of 
good faith when they encounter the frequent problem of long-standing 
encroachments created by prior owners. 
II. GOOD FAITH PURCHASER DOCTRINE 
Good faith has always played an important role in resolving disputes 
that arise when a person who is not actually the owner of a movable 
purports to sell the movable to another. The Louisiana Civil Code 
addresses this subject in Chapter 3 of Title 1 of Book II, entitled “Transfer 
of Ownership by Agreement.” Article 523 of the Civil Code lies at the 
heart of that chapter. It states simply and elegantly, “An acquirer of a 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. Judge Cooks also shrewdly pointed out that the defendant was hardly 
blameworthy in this case—she was “well-informed about the encroachment 
before purchasing the property and purchased it with full knowledge of its 
existence,” which suggests that her and the bank’s mutual knowledge of the 
encroachment likely affected the purchase price for the lot. Id. at 1150. 
 72. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3437 (2018). Precarious possession, of course, 
is the possession of a thing with the permission of or on behalf of the actual owner 
or another possessor. Id. For more on precarious possession and the tendency of 
Louisiana courts to classify acquisitive prescription claimants as precarious 
possessors in some circumstances, see John A. Lovett, Precarious Possession, 77 
LA. L. REV. 617 (2017) [hereinafter Lovett, Precarious Possession]. 




corporeal movable is in good faith for purposes of this Chapter unless he 
knows, or should have known, that the transferor was not the owner.”73 
The drafters of this article, new for the Louisiana Civil Code, drew 
inspiration from a wide range of civilian sources, including the German 
and Greek Civil Codes.74 This provision embeds a clear presumption of 
good faith in its lapidary prose and links good faith to a broad reasonable 
person standard yet leaves plenty of room for judicial interpretation. 
Crucially, this article brings both honesty and carefulness into the good 
faith calculus. 
To understand how this conception of good faith functions, one must 
first consider the purpose of the bona fide purchaser doctrine itself. The 
doctrine seeks to reconcile two important but often conflicting policy 
interests.75 On the one hand, the doctrine must protect security of 
ownership as embodied in the Civil Code’s famous admonition: “The sale 
of a thing belonging to another does not convey ownership.”76 On the other 
hand, it also must protect security of transactions, as illustrated in Article 
2279 of the French Civil Code, which equates possession of movables with 
ownership of or title to movables.77 The concept of good faith, it turns out, 
plays a crucial role in balancing these two competing interests. 
As Professor Ugo Mattei points out, every legal system must decide 
what to do with so-called transfers a non domino—“transfers from someone 
who is not the actual owner of the movable but who has physical possession 
of it to a third party who in good faith relies on him or her being owner.”78 
Such transfers pose “a classic conflict between two innocent parties . . . who 
claim ownership over the same piece of movable property.”79 As Mattei 
explains, two rival paradigms for solving this classic problem have 
competed over the ages in the Western legal tradition.  
One solution, originating in Roman law, gives ownership of the 
movable to the original owner, regardless of how the intermediary took 
                                                                                                             
 73. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 523. 
 74. See id. cmt. a (acknowledging that this provision was “new” and “based 
in part on Article 1037 of the Greek Civil Code and Sec. 932(2) of the German 
Civil Code”). 
 75. DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 7.1, in 24 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012); Se. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Office of State Police, 437 So. 2d 
1184, 1186 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (acknowledging the “competing equities between the 
true owner and the good faith purchaser who are both innocent victims”). 
 76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 245. 
 77. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 2279 (1804) (Fr.) (“In the case of 
movables, possession is equivalent to a title.”). 
 78. MATTEI, supra note 41, at 106–07 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 107. 




possession of the thing, and only considers good faith if the final possessor 
asserts “usuacapio—[that is,] adverse possession for a long time[].”80 In 
this Romanist view, good faith is relatively unimportant and comes into 
the picture only after a significant passage of time and overt possession. 
The second solution, originating in Germanic customary law, asks 
how the original owner relinquished possession. If the original owner 
voluntarily relinquishes possession by turning over the movable to 
someone like a faithless trustee, then the eventual possessor should 
prevail, regardless of her bona fides or mala fides, because the person best 
positioned to prevent the loss is the original owner.81 Under this German 
view, however, if the original owner loses possession involuntarily 
because the movable has been lost or stolen, then the original owner will 
prevail because he lost the property “against his will.”82 Notice that in this 
Germanic formulation the original owner’s carefulness or carelessness 
matters a great deal, and the subsequent acquirer’s honesty or carefulness 
is immaterial. 
According to Mattei, most European legal systems, including notably 
Germany and Switzerland, worked out a compromise. In essence, these 
systems followed the Germanic approach—protecting the owner if he 
loses possession involuntarily but rewarding the eventual transferee if the 
original owner voluntarily departs with possession.83 These systems, 
however, made one crucial qualification: when the original owner entrusts 
the movable to the intermediary, the third-party transferee is protected 
only if she is in good faith.84 
After an initial 170-year period that charitably has been described as 
a “schizophrenic” mélange of first principles favoring security of 
ownership spliced with numerous codal and jurisprudential exceptions in 
favor of the good faith purchaser,85 Louisiana’s contemporary bona fide 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 107–08. 
 82. Id. at 107. 
 83. Id. at 106–08. 
 84. Id. at 107. 
 85. Marie Breaux Stroud, The Sale of a Movable Belonging to Another: A Code 
in Search of a Solution, 4 TUL. CIV. L. F. 41, 47 (1988). See id. at 43–52, for a concise 
history of the bona fide purchaser doctrine from 1808 until the 1979 revision. 
According to several commentators, much of the bona fide purchaser doctrine was 
introduced into Louisiana by courts borrowing from the common law and calling the 
borrowing “natural law.” Id. at 49. As the inimitable Mitchel Franklin put it: “This is, 
then, the Louisiana palimpsest: the code written over by the case law, borrowing 
Anglo-American concepts, under the self-deluding disguise that they are natural law.” 




purchaser doctrine illustrates the modern civil law compromise. In fact, 
the current Louisiana Civil Code heightens the importance of the eventual 
transferee’s good faith by making that characteristic crucial in four distinct 
situations: (1) in the case of lost or stolen things;86 (2) in the case of an 
original owner who is induced by fraud or some other vice of consent to 
part with a movable;87 (3) in the case of either a duplicitous or forgetful 
owner who sells a thing to one person and then turns around and sells the 
same thing to another person before the first vendee takes possession;88 
and (4) the always difficult case of the owner who entrusts his movable to 
a person who proves to be an untrustworthy depositary or bailee.89  
In all four corners of the bona fide purchaser doctrine, two questions 
recur. First, given that the honesty of a good faith acquirer is generally 
presumed in this context, what degree of carefulness is required? Second, 
has the Civil Code or courts provided any useful short cuts for deciding 
whether a bona fide purchaser claimant was careful enough in his 
acquisition of a corporeal movable? 
A. Lost or Stolen Things 
The first bona fide purchaser problem concerns a lost or stolen 
movable. Here, two Civil Code articles provide dueling conceptions of the 
right of the original owner. First, Article 521 states: 
One who has possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfer 
its ownership to another. For purposes of this Chapter, a thing is 
stolen when one has taken possession of it without the consent of 
its owner. A thing is not stolen when the owner delivers it or 
transfers its ownership to another as a result of fraud.90 
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Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 609 (1932). 
 86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 521, 524 (2018). 
 87. See id. arts. 521–22. The classic example is a seller who transfers 
possession of a movable upon receipt of a check that is later dishonored. See, e.g., 
Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957); Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. 
Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 
 88. See id. art. 518. 
 89. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (1979), repealed by Act. No. 125, § 1, 1981 
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resolved solely with resort to Louisiana caselaw, particularly, William Frantz & 
Co. v. Fink, 62 So. 131 (La. 1903). See infra Part II.D. 
 90. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 (2018).  




Putting aside the distinction between theft and fraud for the moment, this 
article appears to create absolute protection for the owner of the lost or 
stolen thing because, as Professor Yiannopoulos explains, the original 
owner “may reclaim it in the hands of the finder or of the thief as well as 
in the hands of any acquirer who purchased it in good faith for fair 
value.”91 Although Professor Yiannopoulos’s statement is undoubtedly 
true in the case of a good faith acquirer who purchases directly from a thief 
or finder, the article does not solve the more difficult and common case of 
an acquirer who purchases from an intermediary who took possession for 
a thief or finder. For that case, one must turn to Article 524, which states: 
The owner of a lost or stolen movable may recover it from a 
possessor who bought it in good faith at a public auction or from 
a merchant customarily selling similar things on reimbursing the 
purchase price. The former owner of a lost, stolen, or abandoned 
movable that has been sold by authority of law may not recover it 
from the purchaser.92 
This article complicates the superficially absolute rule of Article 521 in 
two crucial respects. First, it eliminates the original owner’s right of 
revendication if the eventual purchaser acquires the thing at a publicly 
authorized sale. Second, and more importantly, it significantly limits the 
original owner’s right of revendication by requiring the owner to pay the 
purchaser his purchase price if the eventual purchaser acquires the thing at 
either a public auction or “from a merchant customarily selling similar 
things,” when the purchaser made such an acquisition in “good faith.”93 In 
other words, although the original owner can theoretically regain her 
movable in the market ouvert case,94 the law guarantees the good faith 
purchaser restitution in the form of compensation for the value of the 
movable. 
The revision comments to Article 524 instruct that this provision 
reproduces part of the 1870 Civil Code but overturns prior jurisprudence 
to avoid the difficulties inherent in applying the law of acquisitive 
prescription of movables while protecting buyers in common commercial 
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 92. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 524. 
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transactions.95 On its face, then, Article 524 appears to tip the scales in 
favor of the second of the two relatively innocent parties—here, the good 
faith purchaser—in the interest of protecting everyday commerce.96 
Unfortunately, only a handful of reported Louisiana decisions have 
applied the good faith definition articulated in Article 523 in the context 
of stolen goods, and only two stand out for their contrasting interpretation 
of the good faith requirement in the context of stolen goods.97 
First, in Brown & Root, Inc. v. Southeast Equipment Co., the Louisiana 
First Circuit Court of Appeal held that a purchaser of stolen industrial 
equipment—a wheeled loader—was in good faith for purposes of Article 
524 and thus entitled to reimbursement for its purchase price before it was 
required to return the loader to its original owner.98 In that case, when it 
bought the loader from an equipment dealer in Houston, the purchaser 
                                                                                                             
 95. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 521 rev. cmts. a–b. 
 96. A fair question to ask is whether Article 524 enables thieves to launder 
stolen goods through merchants too easily—particularly when those items are not 
easily traceable through a system of registry. On the other hand, this risk might be 
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this Article. 
 97. In a third decision, Se. Equip. Co. v. Office of State Police, 437 So. 2d 1184, 
1185–86 (La. Ct. App. 1983), the court applied Article 524, but not Article 523, to 
hold that the purchaser of a stolen front-end loader was entitled to reimbursement 
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loader to the original owner. In that case, according to the majority, the parties 
effectively stipulated that the purchaser was in good faith, id. at 1185 n.1, and thus, 
the question for the court was whether the purchaser acquired the loader from a 
“merchant customarily selling similar things” given that it acquired the loader from 
a heavy equipment sales company that was acting as an agent or consigner on behalf 
of another person, the suspected thief. Id. at 1185–86. The court interpreted Article 
524 as only requiring some “dealing” between the good faith purchaser and the 
merchant customarily selling similar things, and it therefore held that “if such a 
merchant conducts the sale, [Article] 524 applies, whether the merchant is acting as 
apparent owner or only as agent for another.” Id. at 1186. Put differently, Article 
524 applies “not only to direct sales of movables from the merchant’s own 
inventory, but also consignment sales, . . . where the merchant is acting as an agent 
on behalf of someone else who purports to be the owner.” Id. at 1185. In dissent, 
Judge Redman argued persuasively that the parties’ stipulation that the purchaser 
did not know that the loader was not stolen was not a stipulation that the purchaser—
Southeast—“was in good faith” and that, in fact, the ease which another prospective 
purchaser learned that the loader had been stolen suggests that Southeast “should 
have known” that the transferor was not the owner. Id. at 1187 (Redman, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  
 98. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Se. Equip. Co., 470 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 




either did not notice or worry about the fact that the manufacturer’s 
original serial number had been gouged out of the loader’s metal frame on 
the front of the vehicle and a fictitious serial number had been glued in its 
place.99 The court found these facts insufficiently alarming so as to spur 
the purchaser to engage in further inquiry as to the purported vendor’s 
ownership, particularly in the absence of any indication that the loader’s 
$23,000 purchase price loader was unusually low.100 In Brown and Root, 
the general presumption of good faith embedded in Article 523 may have 
tipped the balance in favor of the purchaser despite the suspicious 
conditions of the loader’s serial number.101 
Several years later, in Livestock Producers, Inc. v. Littleton, a court 
found that an intermediary purchaser of 74 cattle from a cattle dealer who 
was trying to sell the cattle quickly did not act in good faith and thus was 
not entitled to reimbursement when the purchaser later learned that the 
cattle effectively had been stolen from their actual owner—the defendant 
Littleton.102 In this complicated tale of cattle swindling, three salient sets 
of facts emerged. First, B.L. Littleton, the actual owner, who eventually 
sought return of the cattle, had previously tagged and marked the cattle 
with his own Texas registered brand—BL—after he had purchased the 
cattle from Smith, an apparent owner.103 Second, the rushed sale of the 
cattle took place at a cattle auction business run by Ronnie Stratton, doing 
business as Livestock Producers, Inc. (“LPI”), the final purchaser of the 
74 cattle and the party who eventually sought protection under Article 
524.104 Finally, at the time of the rushed intermediate sale, the BL brand, 
which actually belonged to Littleton, was referenced in the Louisiana 
brand book as belonging to a Coushatta farmer with no connection to 
Smith, the person purporting to sell the cows at the auction as owner, or 
anyone else connected with the cattle.105 Notably, Smith, the duplicitous 
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 102. Livestock Prods., Inc. v. Littleton, 748 So. 2d 537 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
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intermediary who had been put in possession of the cattle pursuant to a 
paid pasturage agreement, was not a regular customer of the auction.106 
In these circumstances, the court, distinguishing Brown & Root, held 
that the purchaser, Stratton/LPI, was not actually in good faith because, as 
an auctioneer and regular player in the cattle trade, he should have been 
immediately suspicious when the brands of the cattle offered for sale 
appeared to be unconnected to the purported vendor, Smith.107 As the court 
noted, 
Even though the brand actually belonged to Littleton and was 
registered in Texas, not only did Stratton fail to check the brand 
registry in neighboring states, but when the brand did not seem to 
fit with Smith, he made no further inquiry. Given the freshness of 
the brand, Stratton should have at least questioned the ownership 
of the cattle. Smith was pressing for a quick, private sale of the 
last of the cows from the herd. Stratton moved forward to purchase 
the cows and immediately resell them for a quick profit.108 
Here, the court engaged in a finely textured assessment of the 
reasonableness—of the carefulness—of the purchaser’s actions. That 
assessment takes account of not only the quality of the seller’s personal 
reputation but also the availability of a de facto registry system in the form 
of the state branding books, an apparent red flag in that registry, the 
apparently low purchase price for the movables, and the buyer’s 
experience in the marketplace.109 One commentator has noted that the case 
could have been conceptualized as a faithless entrustment case because the 
cows technically were not stolen but rather voluntarily put in Smith’s 
possession by Littleton, and thus, the dispute could have been more neatly 
solved by application of repealed Article 520. Yet even if Littleton had 
been framed as a faithless entrustment case demanding application of 
repealed Article 520, good faith would have still been a crucial 
consideration as that article itself only protects a “transferee in good faith 
for fair value.”110 In short, the court’s conclusion that the third party 
purchaser seeking protection of Article 524 in Livestock Producers did not 
act in good faith seems entirely sensible. The court’s conclusion takes 
account of many of the relevant facts revealing the third party purchaser’s 
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relative carelessness in the circumstances by noting the many suspicious 
circumstances surrounding the transaction, the ease of further inquiry, and 
the purchaser’s experience in this particular kind of market.111  
B. Annullable Title 
The next bona fide purchaser problem features an original owner or 
purported owner who is induced by fraud to relinquish possession of his 
corporeal movable—the problem of annullable, or voidable, title. Here, 
recall that Article 521 defines “stolen things” quite narrowly as only 
including things that have been taken away from the owner without his 
consent while excluding things that the owner delivered to another “as a 
result of fraud.”112 Two articles define the scope of available remedies to 
the owner and professed innocent purchaser in this situation. 
First, Article 525 instructs that “the provisions of this Chapter do not 
apply to movables that are required by law to be registered in public 
records,”113 such as vehicles, mobile homes, and other movables subject 
to statutory registration systems.114 Nevertheless, as the revision 
comments to this article indicate, Louisiana courts occasionally have 
looked to the state’s good faith purchaser doctrine to solve cases in which 
parties have failed to comply with these statutory registry regimes.115 
Perhaps aware that specialized registration systems would not be 
applicable to all fraudulent sale cases and that courts might look to the 
good faith purchaser doctrine anyway, the Louisiana Legislature enacted 
a specific provision for the case of the annullable title. That provision, 
Article 522, states that “[a] transferee of a corporeal movable in good faith 
and for fair value retains the ownership of the thing even though the title 
of the transferor is annulled on account of a vice of consent.”116  
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The modern caselaw relevant to this corner of the good faith purchaser 
doctrine, however, is quite sparse. Several decisions stand for the 
proposition that when there is a conflict between two innocent parties 
resulting from an initial sale induced by presentation of a subsequently 
dishonored check by an intermediate purchaser—that is, a classic voidable 
title—courts examine the equities of the situation to determine which of 
the parties—the initial vendor or a subsequent transferee—is most 
responsible for the loss.117 In short, courts inquire into carefulness but 
structure that inquiry in a relational manner to determine whose 
carelessness was most responsible for the potential loss. 
Another complexity arises from the fact that the Vehicle Certificate of 
Title Law appears to prevent a marketable title from being obtained in the 
absence of compliance with that law.118 Nevertheless, despite this 
prohibition, courts in a number of cases have found that an original vendor 
who relinquished possession of a valuable motor vehicle without assuring 
that the purchaser’s check was actually drawn on sufficient funds is the 
more careless party, so a third-party good faith purchaser for value is 
entitled to retain possession of the vehicle.119 The only instances in which 
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courts have chosen not to protect third-party purchasers in this context 
involve situations in which the original owner did not actually execute any 
documents that could be characterized as an instrument conveying or 
certifying title to the fraudulent intermediary, and thus, its actions did not 
clothe the intermediary with any indicia of ownership.120 In summary, in 
the case of annullable title, courts take the eventual transferee’s good faith 
for granted unless they find strong evidence of irregularity, and most of 
the time courts will focus on the negligence of the original owner who 
relinquished possession and created the potentially voidable title.121 
C. The Double Sale 
The third bona fide purchaser problem differs from the rest in that the 
two relatively innocent parties are both transferees from the original 
owner. In the case of a double sale, the original owner of a corporeal 
movable sells the same object to one person and then to another person 
before the first vendee takes possession. Once again, good faith plays a 
decisive role in allocating rights. Article 518 supplies the rule for this 
scenario: 
The ownership of a movable is voluntarily transferred by a 
contract between the owner and the transferee that purports to 
transfer the ownership of the movable. Unless otherwise provided, 
the transfer of ownership takes place as between the parties by the 
effect of the agreement and against third persons when the 
possession of the movable is delivered to the transferee. 
 
When possession has not been delivered, a subsequent transferee 
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to whom possession is delivered acquires ownership provided he 
is in good faith. Creditors of the transferor may seize the movable 
while it is still in his possession.122 
The first paragraph of Article 518 mirrors the publicity principle 
announced in Article 517 with respect to immovables.123 The voluntary 
transfer of a movable becomes effective between the parties at the moment 
the contract setting the terms for that transfer is confected, unless the 
contract provides that ownership will transfer at some other time or after 
some condition is fulfilled. Delivery—transfer of possession—is not 
required for ownership of the movable to transfer between the parties. Yet 
just as recordation is required for the transfer of an immovable to be 
effective against third parties, possession of a movable must be delivered 
from the transferor to the transferee for the transfer of the movable to have 
any effect on third parties.124  
Good faith entered the framework of Article 518 in the 1984 revision 
of the law of conventional obligations when the legislature added the 
article’s second paragraph to replace Articles 1922 and 1923 of the 1870 
Civil Code.125 Those articles, like their source articles in even earlier civil 
codes, articulated the same rules, albeit in more antique and verbose 
language.126 These source articles reveal that as far back as 1808, when a 
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vendor tried to sell the same thing twice, the second transferee prevailed 
over the first transferee and retained ownership as long as the first 
transferee did not obtain possession and the second transferee was in good 
faith at the moment his contract was formed.127 Perhaps because it 
confirms such a well-established principle in Louisiana law,128 Article 
518(2) rarely has been the subject of reported judicial decisions.129 
Yet one decision is notable. In Cameron Equipment Co. v. Stewart & 
Stevenson Services, Inc., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal 
applied Article 518 to the multiple sales of two valuable diesel engines by 
the same vendor.130 In June 1987, the original owner, a company known as 
Petroleum Services, sold two engines to another company called Cameron 
Equipment.131 For reasons that are unclear, even though it paid $73,000 for 
the engines and some other used oilfield equipment, Cameron Equipment 
did not take physical possession of the two engines or mark them as its 
property.132 Instead, the engines remained in storage at an equipment yard 
managed by another entity.133 Two years later, a quick succession of 
transactions resulted in the same engines being sold by Petroleum Services, 
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the original vendor, to a third purchaser, which then sold the engines to a 
fourth purchaser, which in turn sold them to a fifth purchaser.134 At this 
point, the commercial drama took a curious turn. Just one day after it 
brokered the engines to the fifth—and last—purchaser, the fourth 
purchaser actually picked up the engines from the yard where they had 
been stored and delivered them to the last purchaser.135 Coincidentally, just 
a few hours later, Cameron Equipment, the first purchaser, arrived at the 
storage yard to pick up its engines, only to discover they were gone.136 
Not surprisingly, Cameron Equipment sued everyone, including the 
president and sole shareholder of the original vendor, Petroleum 
Services.137 Although Cameron Equipment obtained a judgment against 
Petroleum Services, the original vendor, for $50,000—the fair market 
value of the engines at the time of the second sale—for conversion, the 
trial court, relying on Article 518, dismissed all of Cameron Equipment’s 
claims against the subsequent, third-party purchasers because it had not 
taken actual or constructive possession of the engines and thus did not 
perfect its ownership against the subsequent purchasers, all of whom the 
trial court determined acted in good faith.138 The Louisiana Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal affirmed, specifically rejecting Cameron Equipment’s 
argument that Article 518 was inapplicable merely because the subsequent 
purchasers each purchased from a vendor who was not in actual possession 
of the engines at the time of the respective sales.139 Although the court of 
appeal did not fully analyze the subsequent purchasers’ good faith, the 
clear implication of its ruling is that a purchaser can be in good faith even 
when his vendor does not have corporeal possession of the thing sold. 
As a matter of general principle, the court’s ruling in Cameron 
Equipment makes perfect sense. One can easily imagine scenarios in 
which a vendor offers a movable for sale but the movable is not in the 
vendor’s actual possession—for instance when a vendor has temporarily 
transferred possession of the thing for sale to a depositary or bailee. In 
Cameron Equipment, perhaps each successive purchaser reasonably 
assumed that its vendor had left the two engines in the third-party 
equipment yard under such an arrangement. Nevertheless, it remains 
somewhat curious that this kind of bailment relationship was presumed to 
exist three times in a row in quick succession. What if other facts existed 
that might have put a reasonably prudent purchaser on notice to investigate 
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the provenance of the engines offered for sale? Unfortunately, the 
appellate court opinion never addressed this concern, leaving today’s 
reader with a vague sense of unease. Perhaps the purchasers in Cameron 
Equipment were all honest, but they all may not have been sufficiently 
careful in the curious circumstances of this transaction. 
Maybe the best explanation for the result in Cameron Equipment 
emerges if the inquiry about carefulness is widened to encompass the 
original purchaser, Cameron Equipment, who certainly could have 
avoided the entire mess if it had simply taken secure possession of the 
valuable engines it had purchased—or at least marked them as its property 
in some easily observable manner—as soon as it bought them. The court’s 
decision to limit Cameron Equipment’s remedy to a breach of contract 
claim against its own corporate vendor feels intuitively just because, after 
all, its carelessness was the ultimate source of this commercial debacle.140 
D. The Faithless Pledgee, Lessee, or Depositary 
The last bona fide purchaser scenario—the faithless pledgee, lessee, 
or depositary—reveals a gap in the Civil Code produced by the much-
lamented repeal of Article 520 in 1981, just two years after the Louisiana 
Legislature adopted the revised chapter on Transfer of Ownership by 
Agreement.141 Many commentators argue that the repeal of this article has 
left the bona fide purchaser doctrine in shambles because this single article 
formed the foundation upon which the entire superstructure of the Civil 
Code revision of the bona fide purchaser doctrine rested.142 The author of 
this Article remains more sanguine than many of his Louisiana colleagues. 
Repealed Article 520 provided that “[a] transferee in good faith for 
fair value acquires the ownership of a corporeal movable, if the transferor, 
though not the owner, has possession with the consent of the owner, as 
                                                                                                             
 140. Addressing Cameron Equipment’s claim to pierce the corporate veil and 
hold the president and sole shareholder of Petroleum Services liable, the court of 
appeal accurately observed that the plaintiff’s claim was better described as one 
for “breach of warranty by the seller” and then noted that the plaintiff failed to 
prove any of the elements of fraud necessary to justify piercing the corporate veil. 
Id. at 701. 
 141. The Louisiana Legislature, in fact, first suspended the article in 1980, S. 
Con. Res. 172, Reg. Sess. (La. 1980), and delivered the decisive blow the 
following year. Act. No. 125, § 1, 1981 La. Acts 351. 
 142. Sinclair, supra note 111, at 518, 523; Stroud, supra note 85, at 60–63; 
Tanya Ann Ibieta, Comment, The Transfer of Ownership of Movables, 47 LA. L. 
REV. 841, 848–53 (1987). 




pledgee, lessee, or depositary, or other person of similar standing.”143 One 
commentator suggests Article 520 was intended to codify a rule “similar 
to but broader than the jurisprudential doctrine of equitable estoppel.”144 
Another commentator explains that the article was intended to provide a 
broad exception to the general rule of Article 518—“that only an owner or 
someone authorized by him may transfer ownership in a movable”—
whenever there has been a transfer by a mere possessor, rather than the 
original owner.145 A third commentator argues that this article, a 
significant exception to the rule that one cannot convey ownership of 
property that belongs to another, “represented an unequivocal policy shift 
to protect the stability of seemingly valid transactions over the rights of 
owners.”146 In their treatise on the law of sales, Professors Gruning and 
Tooley-Knoblett describe Article 520 as the “key article in the chapter” 
and suggest that it “picked up where Article 2279 of the French Code left 
off, articulating the concept of possession as indicative of ownership of 
movables, but with greater clarity.”147 Why then was such a wondrously 
drafted and well-intentioned article repealed? Why has it not been 
replaced? 
The story that has been told time and again in Louisiana involves two 
powerful commercial interest groups who did not like Article 520 and 
convinced the Legislature to repeal the provision. First, the equipment 
leasing industry worried that untrustworthy lessees would be able to 
transfer ownership of valuable leased equipment to good faith purchasers 
for value too easily and the equipment lessors would be left only with 
claims against judgement-proof lessees.148 Second, chattel mortgage 
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holders who financed the sales of motor vehicles and other valuable 
movables, along with equipment lenders, worried about the security of 
their collateral.149 Critics of the repeal of Article 520 have argued that these 
concerns were overblown. Lessors of unregistered movables could have 
protected their interests by performing more careful credit examinations 
of their lessees, by permanently marking their leased property, or by 
acquiring security interests in the leased movables.150 Chattel mortgage 
holders, at least those who had perfected their mortgages, were also not 
really at risk because they enjoyed an enforceable preference against any 
purported good faith purchaser.151  
Although these critics no doubt correctly point out the legal remedies 
equipment lessors and chattel mortgage holders held at their disposal, the 
fears of the equipment lessors in particular cannot be dismissed as entirely 
insignificant. It stands to reason that if equipment lessors had continued to 
feel threatened by Article 520, they might have invested more time and 
money examining their lessees’ creditworthiness or obtaining security 
interests, which might well have raised the cost of leasing equipment and, 
in turn, raised the cost of construction activities across the state. Of course, 
these empirical assumptions are not easily testable. 
In any event, given that the Louisiana Legislature repealed Article 520 
and has yet to replace it, Louisiana courts must turn to existing caselaw 
and general principles to resolve cases involving faithless pledgees, 
lessees, or depositaries. Two decisions, 90 years apart, suggest how 
Louisiana courts are likely to muddle their way through, relying, as they 
must, on good faith. 
William Frantz & Co. v. Fink presents a case of the faithless depositary 
straight from central casting.152 The plaintiff, William Frantz & Co. 
(“Frantz”), a firm that operated a large jewelry store in New Orleans, gave 
a man named Moss, an artisan who made, repaired, and occasionally 
traded in jewelry, possession of two pairs of diamond earrings on 
consignment.153 Moss claimed he had some customers who might be 
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interested in buying the earrings, so Frantz let Moss take them on the 
condition that Moss return them or pay a price for them, a price low 
enough that Moss presumably could make a profit for his sales efforts.154 
Moss, however, transferred both pairs of earrings to other individuals who 
did not know that the earrings actually belonged to Frantz and had only 
been consigned to Moss.155 
The first transferee, a pawnbroker named Fink, purchased one pair of 
earrings from Moss for $300, a price considerably less than the one Frantz 
actually had set.156 Moss transferred the other pair of earrings to another 
pawnbroker named Koritzky by the way of pledge.157 The trouble began 
when Fink, the initial transferee from Moss, gave Moss 171 loose diamonds 
to set in a pin or broach.158 Moss worked Fink’s 171 diamonds into a pin, 
but Moss pledged the pin and diamonds to yet another pawnbroker, Keil.159 
When Fink returned to reclaim his diamonds, Moss revealed that he had 
pledged the diamonds and the pin to Keil and then, with admirable chutzpah, 
told Fink that he could have the second pair of earrings pledged at 
Koritzky’s shop if Fink redeemed them and also redeemed the pin and 
diamonds at Keil’s shop.160 At this point, Fink made a fateful decision. 
Rather than call the police, Fink agreed to Moss’s scheme and redeemed the 
second set of diamond earrings that had been previously pledged to 
Koritzky, presumably after also paying to get his 171 diamonds back from 
Kiel.161 
After Frantz, the original owner, inquired about its diamond earrings, 
Moss told a suspicious story about how two armed men had robbed him at 
his shop.162 At this point, Moss was arrested and finally revealed the entire 
story of the earrings.163 Frantz sued Moss and sued Fink for return of both 
pairs of the diamond earrings.164 In defense, Fink sought to keep both pairs 
of earrings, arguing that Frantz had sold them to Moss as common law “sale 
and return” transactions by which Moss could convey good title to Fink.165 
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On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court, through a typically 
learned and Solomonic opinion authored by Justice Oliver Provosty, held 
that estoppel barred Frantz from recovering the first set of earrings but not 
the second.166 Provosty observed that Frantz’s initial actions—transferring 
possession to Moss and also consenting that Moss, “a vender of jewelry[,] 
exhibit the jewels as part of his stock of goods”—were sufficient to clothe 
Moss, the consignee, with sufficient indicia of ownership to convey 
title.167 Consequently, Frantz was thus estopped from denying Fink’s title 
with respect to the first pair of earrings. In other words, at the time of the 
first transfer of earrings from Moss to Fink, the court found there were no 
facts that should have put Fink on notice that Moss was anything but their 
owner, and, therefore, “Fink, knowing [Moss] to be a trader in jewels, was 
justified in buying from him,” and “acquired a good title to the first pair 
of earrings.”168 
The court held, however, that Fink could not assert equitable estoppel 
with respect to the second pair of earrings because by the time he acquired 
these from Moss, Fink had plenty of reasons to doubt Moss’s purported 
status as owner.169 Indeed Moss’s actions with respect to Fink’s 171 loose 
diamonds should have opened his eyes to the likelihood that Moss was “a 
confessed embezzler.”170 Accordingly, the court held that although Fink 
could keep the first set of earrings, he must return the second set to 
Frantz.171 
William Franks and Co. v. Fink represents a rhapsody on the good 
faith themes of honesty and carefulness. Justice Provosty essentially found 
that Frantz bore some responsibility for its relative carelessness by 
entrusting valuable diamond earrings to Moss, but he also concluded that 
Fink’s own utter carelessness condemned him to lose ownership of the 
second pair of earrings because by the time he gained possession of them, 
he had no excuse in ignoring Moss’s dishonesty. 
Interestingly, if a case involving similar facts were to arise today and 
if, for the sake of argument, Article 520 remained part of the Civil Code, 
the outcome might not have been all that different. To prevail under Article 
520, Fink still would have to prove he was a “transferee in good faith for 
fair value.”172 Assuming he paid fair value, Fink’s good faith would be 
determined by asking, pursuant to Article 523, whether he knew or should 
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have known that Moss was not the owner of the earrings. One suspects the 
change of circumstances between the first earring transaction and the 
second likely would be sufficient to transform Moss from, in Justice 
Provosty’s words, “a merchant or trader having valuable goods for sale” 
into a “diamond setter who had pledged the goods of his employer and 
stood under the necessity of confessing his crime because of his inability 
to redeem the pledge.”173 In short, the change in circumstances would still 
transform Fink from good faith purchaser to “willing victim.”174 
In Louisiana Lift & Equipment Co. v. Eizel, a Louisiana court solved 
another faithless intermediary case by relying on the general concept of 
good faith.175 In that case, Eizel wanted to purchase a new forklift from 
Louisiana Lift but lacked sufficient credit.176 To work around this problem, 
Eizel and Louisiana Lift entered into a rent-to-own contract—technically, a 
“Rental Purchase Transaction Agreement”—pursuant to which Eizel would 
make 36 monthly payments and then become owner of the forklift.177 
Despite a clause in the lease prohibiting the lessee-purchaser from selling 
the forklift during the lease, and after making only 11 payments, Eizel sold 
the forklift to a third party, Creamer Furniture/Creamer Brothers, Inc. 
(“Creamer”).178 
When Louisiana Lift sued to recover the forklift from Creamer, the 
trial court ruled in favor of the original owner, Louisiana Lift, ordering 
Creamer to return the forklift or pay Louisiana Lift its fair market value.179 
The court of appeal, however, reversed, holding that the third party, 
Creamer, was a good faith purchaser pursuant to Article 524 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code—the article addressing the rights of good faith 
acquirers of lost or stolen things—because at the time Creamer purchased 
the forklift there was no evidence it belonged to Louisiana Lift.180 
Consequently, Louisiana Lift could regain possession of the forklift only 
if it paid Creamer its purchase price—$9,000.181 Distinguishing Brown & 
Root,182 the court of appeal characterized Creamer as a good faith acquirer 
for several reasons: (1) there were no decals or other markings on the 
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forklift indicating Louisiana Lift’s ownership; (2) no liens had been filed 
with respect to the forklift, and Creamer claimed it had checked for liens; 
(3) Eizel’s business appeared legitimate at the time he sold the forklifts to 
Creamer; and (4) the mere fact that Eizel was liquidating his business did 
not put Creamer on inquiry notice under Article 523.183 
No doubt one can point to flaws in the court’s analysis in Louisiana 
Lift. First, even assuming Article 524 was applicable despite the absence 
of a real act of theft, the court failed to ask whether Eizel was a merchant 
customarily selling similar goods so as to warrant Creamer’s claim to good 
faith purchaser status. Further, as Judge Caraway pointed out in his 
dissent, the mere fact that Article 520 had been repealed did not somehow 
transform Eizel, the lessee, into a thief such that Article 524 properly 
applied in this case.184 In addition, § 1-203 of Chapter 9 of Louisiana’s 
version of the Uniform Commercial Code might have solved this case had 
the court bothered to apply it.185 Finally, this case would have been more 
neatly solved by Article 520 because then Creamer would surely have been 
protected as a good faith purchaser for value from a lessee.186 
On the other hand, at least the court in Louisiana Lift did not try to 
resolve the case by relying on the principle of Article 2452 that “[t]he sale 
of a thing belonging to another does not convey ownership.”187 Moreover, 
the court also answered the fundamentally appropriate questions—
questions that would have been relevant under almost any framework. 
After all, the court determined that the third-party purchaser, Creamer, 
acted honestly and with a reasonable degree of carefulness when it 
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purchased the forklift.188 It also found that the lessor, Louisiana Lift, failed 
to take some reasonable measures—marking its equipment and filing 
liens, for example—that could have prevented any loss from occurring.189 
In sum, in cases of faithless pledgees, lessees, and depositaries, even 
in the absence of Article 520, courts appear to revert to their default good 
faith analysis. Sometimes they use the common law language of estoppel 
as their guidepost. Sometimes they borrow other tools in the bona fide 
purchaser doctrine tool kit, even if those tools are not a perfect fit. But they 
always inquire about the honesty and carefulness of the good faith 
purchaser claimant and often widen their inquiry to investigate the 
potential carelessness of the original owner who put its movable in the 
hands of another person. 
III. ACCESSION 
The same legislative act that updated Louisiana’s bona fide purchaser 
doctrine also revised the Louisiana Civil Code provisions addressing 
accession.190 The law of accession generally serves to bracket disparate 
resources together in one economic unit typically based on relationships 
of physical proximity and practical connection between things.191 
Frequently, accession rules produce intuitively comfortable and 
economically efficient outcomes.192 For instance, although buildings, 
other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber, 
and unharvested crops all can be owned separately from the land to which 
they are physically connected, Louisiana law presumes that these things 
form an integrated economic unit with the land unless clear evidence of 
separate ownership exists.193 Landowners, the law of accession presumes, 
will take care to manage these accessory things in efficient ways that 
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maximize both their value and the value of the land to which they are 
connected.194 
Problems arise in the law of accession, however, when someone other 
than the owner of the underlying immovable erects buildings or other 
constructions, plants or harvests crops, cuts standing timber, or removes 
minerals from the earth, and that person—the active party who produces 
some value by his engagement with the accessory thing—does not 
separately own the accessory thing. In other words, sometimes a new 
accessory thing will appear as a result of the labor, work, or investment of 
“possessors”—persons who intend to become owners of the land but lack 
a title either to the immovable or to the new resources they are tasked with 
bringing into the world.195  
General principles of unjust enrichment, which tend to circulate just 
beneath the surface of many specialized rules of accession, could resolve 
many of these conflicts.196 But it would be difficult and time consuming to 
perform a thorough unjust enrichment analysis of the competing rights of 
the owner and possessor in all of these situations. Further, Louisiana law 
has cast unjust enrichment as a subsidiary—that is, a not particularly 
robust—remedy.197 For these reasons, and as shown in the following 
discussion as well, Louisiana has embedded within its law of accession a 
number of short-hand rules to make efficient, rough-cut allocations of the 
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remedial rights that possessors can assert with respect to new resources 
they have created or produced on another person’s immovable. 
Although three sets of accession rules relate to immovable property as 
a general class, only one set employs good faith as a rule of decision.198 
The most general set of rules first declares that the owner of a thing 
acquires ownership of the civil and natural fruits yielded by that thing.199 
The Civil Code then provides that when fruits are produced by the work 
of another person, the owner can retain them only if he reimburses the 
producer of the fruits for his production expenses.200 This default rule 
establishes a limited form of restitution for a producer of fruits, regardless 
of the producer’s status as a good or bad faith possessor or even as a 
precarious possessor. 
A second, more complicated set of rules addresses disputes between 
owners and precarious possessors—persons who make constructions on or 
plant things on the land of another with the owner’s consent—after the 
initial consent has been removed.201 This second set of rules, generally 
applicable to persons like servitude holders or others possessing though a 
formal or informal license, also does not implicate good faith.202 
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The third set of rules regulates disputes between owners and actual, 
non-precarious possessors and makes a series of rough-cut allocations 
based on whether the possessor was in good faith or bad faith.203 The Civil 
Code allocates ownership of gathered fruits—whether natural or civil—to 
a good faith possessor who gathered them before being evicted by the 
owner and also rewards the good faith possessor with reimbursement of 
expenses for fruits he was unable to gather before eviction.204 Conversely, 
the bad faith possessor must return to the owner fruits he gathered before 
eviction or their value, but he is entitled to reimbursement for his 
expenses.205 With respect to products—things like minerals or standing 
timber whose removal diminishes the substance or value of the land in the 
intermediate to long term206—a good faith possessor can claim 
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the removal or harvesting of such 
items, but the bad faith possessor cannot.207 
Further, when constructions, plantings, or works are made by a 
possessor in good faith, the owner of the immovable, somewhat 
surprisingly to law students at least, “may not demand their demolition and 
removal”;208 instead, the owner must keep them and reimburse the 
possessor, at the owner’s option, “either the cost of the materials and of 
the workmanship, or their current value, or the enhanced value of the 
immovable.”209 In contrast, when these same things are made by a bad 
faith possessor, the owner of the immovable can choose whether to keep 
them or demand their demolition and removal at the expense of the bad 
faith possessor.210 Further, the owner can obtain compensation for any 
other provable damage.211 Additionally, if the owner of the immovable 
elects to keep these things, he does not have to pay the bad faith possessor 
for inseparable improvements like a pond or a ditch, though he still must 
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pay the bad faith possessor, at the owner’s option, “either the current value 
of the materials and of the workmanship of the separable improvements 
[for example, a house or a barn] that he has kept or the enhanced value of 
the immovable.”212 
Finally, after an owner has prevailed on a petitory or revendicatory 
action, an evicted possessor can still recover necessary expenses incurred 
for the preservation of the thing and the discharge of public or private 
burdens,213 but only a good faith possessor can recover additionally for 
“useful expenses to the extent they have enhanced the value of the 
thing.”214 In short, in this crucial third realm of accession, good faith 
possessors, good faith harvesters, good faith product extractors, and good 
faith improvers all are treated better than their bad faith counterparts. 
In light of this repeated preferential treatment of good faith possessors, 
then, the law of accession needs a handy, easily understood principle to 
make these important good-versus-bad-faith distinctions workable. Article 
487 of the revised Civil Code provides the rule: 
For purposes of accession, a possessor is in good faith when he 
possesses by virtue of an act translative of ownership and does not 
know of any defects in his ownership. He ceases to be in good 
faith when these defects are made known to him or an action is 
instituted against him by the owner for the recovery of the thing.215 
Derived with only minor variations from Article 503 of the 1870 Civil 
Code216 and its earlier Louisiana and Code Napoleon predecessors,217 
current Article 487 contains three distinctive features. 
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First, good faith for purposes of accession requires two components. 
The possessor must possess by virtue of some act translative of ownership, 
which, in the case of immovable property, must be either an authentic act 
or act under private signature.218 Additionally, the possessor also must be 
ignorant of any defects in the act.219 Thus, the possessor cannot simply 
believe that he is the owner simply because he believes his predecessor in 
title was also the owner, but he must also be unaware that the instrument 
by which he thinks he acquired ownership is defective.220 
 Unlike the definitions used for purposes of acquisitive prescription or 
the bona fide purchaser doctrine, however, Article 487’s definition does 
not import a reasonable person standard.221 Consequently, as long as the 
possessor possesses by virtue of a facially translative act, and as long as 
the possessor remains unaware that the act is flawed in some manner or 
originated from a person who was not actually the owner of all or part of 
the thing purportedly transferred, a possessor still can be in good faith for 
purposes of accession even if the possessor’s ignorance is objectively 
unreasonable—even foolish—under the circumstances.222 The omission of 
an objective reasonableness standard in Article 487 means that good faith 
in the context of accession will focus primarily on honesty—and not 
carefulness—particularly as reflected in the positive requirement of an act 
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translative of ownership and the negative requirement of unawareness of 
defects.223  
Finally, in contrast to acquisitive prescription, a possessor’s good faith 
for purposes of accession is temporally contingent; at the very instant that 
the possessor acquires either actual knowledge—“when these defects are 
made known to him”—or constructive knowledge of defects—“an action 
is instituted against him by the owner for the recovery of the thing”—his 
good faith ceases and the possessor instantaneously is transformed into a 
bad faith possessor.224 Accordingly, the rather robust restitution-based 
benefits that a possessor acquires under the law of accession if he 
possesses in good faith can disappear immediately when the spell of honest 
belief is broken, leaving the possessor with the much weaker remedies of 
a bad faith possessor.225 
This immediate temporal shift in accessorial remedies makes sense, 
though, especially in the context of civil and natural fruits, which tend to 
accumulate over time. A possessor who starts out in good faith but then 
learns of defects in his title should not be able to benefit from natural and 
civil fruits that accrue after he learns he is not the owner. Article 489, 
which allows for apportionment of natural and civil fruits, logically builds 
on this principle that good faith for purposes of accession is temporally 
contingent.226 
Louisiana judicial decisions addressing accession claims by possessors 
generally demonstrate that the relatively straightforward, honesty-focused 
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rule articulated by Article 487 serves its functional purpose well. Courts 
make quick and ready determinations about a possessor’s good faith and 
sort with little difficulty the competing claims of the owner of an 
immovable and a possessor with regard to civil or natural fruits and 
reimbursement rights connected to improvements. 
Consider a recent example, Lemoine v. Downs, in which a grandmother 
claimed that she owned 30 acres of land that her husband had donated many 
years earlier to her grandson.227 The grandmother claimed title because at 
the time of the earlier donation her grandson was an unemancipated minor 
and her husband had later attempted to revoke the donation and give the 
property to her.228 The court eventually held that the grandmother was not 
the owner of the property because the original donation was only relatively 
null and thus could only be revoked by the grandson, who, of course, later 
asserted his ownership of the property.229 
When the grandmother eventually asserted accession claims against 
her own grandson, the undisputed record owner of the property, the court 
of appeal made quick work of her claims. It first held that the grandmother 
was entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses incurred to cut down 
a tree and implicitly approved of her right to keep the initial rental income 
derived from the property.230 But it also concluded that because the 
grandmother became a bad faith possessor under Article 487 at the 
moment that the grandson reconvened to assert his ownership rights, the 
grandson was entitled to all of the civil fruits produced by the property from 
the moment of the filing of the reconventional demand, subject to deduction 
for certain other expenses incurred to preserve the property and a general 
15% deduction from the rental income to reward the grandmother for her 
efforts involved in renting the property.231 Importantly, the court sorted out 
these reimbursement and civil fruit apportionment issues in short order, 
without needing to assess the carefulness component of the grandmother’s 
purported good faith.232 
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Other accession decisions display a similar allocative efficiency. In 
one recent case, the court found that the operator of an oil and gas 
production unit possessed certain land within the unit without the consent 
of the landowner.233 As a result, the operator owed to the land owner the 
proceeds of the oil and gas production attributable to those lands.234 
Crucially, because the operator did not possess by virtue of an act 
translative of ownership in its favor, the court also concluded that the 
operator possessed in bad faith under Article 487 and therefore could not 
claim reimbursement for any of the expenses of production under Article 
488.235 
In other cases involving mineral production, the crucial determination 
of whether a produce who turns out to be a mere possessor and not a 
rightful mineral lease or servitude holder can claim production expenses 
again turns on the relatively mechanistic application of Article 487, even 
though strictly speaking a mineral lease or servitude only creates real 
rights and is not an act translative of ownership.236 In these cases, the 
courts often hold that a producer/operator ceases to be in good faith under 
Articles 487 and 488 at the moment an action is instituted against it,237 or 
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could not constitute a just title because it was an act declarative—not translative—
of rights of ownership). 
 233. Caldwell Lands, Inc. v. Cedyco Corp., 980 So. 2d 827, 830 (La. Ct. App. 
2008) (on rehearing). 
 234. Id. at 828. 
 235. Id. (reversing the previous decision finding an operator to be a good faith 
possessor under Article 487 based on determination that record did not contain an 
act translative of ownership in favor of operator). 
 236. Article 3483 of the Civil Code defines a “just title” for purposes of 
acquisitive prescription as a juridical act “sufficient to transfer ownership or 
another real right,” whereas Article 487 uses the more limited language of “an act 
translative of ownership.” Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3483 (2018), with 
id. art. 487. In some of the cases discussed in this section, courts miss this 
distinction between acts translative of ownership and acts establishing real rights. 
In one case, for example, the court asks whether an operator owns or “does not 
own a lease.” Caldwell, 980 So.2d at 829. In another, the court inquired into 
whether the claimants knew of “the defects in their ownership of the lease.” 
Edmundson Bros. P’ship v. Montex Drilling Co., 731 So. 2d 1049, 1064 (La. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 237. See, e.g., Lamson Petroleum Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 823 So. 
3d 431, 437 (La. Ct. App 2002) (holding that second oil company was not a good 
faith possessor after first oil company filed its lawsuit regarding ownership 
dispute over property and thus was not entitled to recover production expenses 




when some other event transpires, such as the transmission of a demand 
letter or expiration of a lease, which clearly signals that a possessor no 
longer has a legal right to remain on the underlying immovable property.238 
Further, the mere misconception of a possessor that he might have a valid 
claim to the property is clearly insufficient to establish good faith for 
purposes of accession if the possessor lacks a title valid in form and relies 
instead on pure parol evidence.239 
Courts have also quickly dispatched accessorial reimbursement claims 
asserted under the accession articles with the observation that claimants 
who possess an immovable pursuant to a lease or sub-lease can never be a 
good faith possessor because they do not possess by virtue of an act 
translative of ownership; at most they are consensual, precarious 
possessors whose accession-based remedies lie under other provisions of 
the Civil Code dealing with these kinds of improvers,240 or specifically 
with lessees.241 The logic and fairness of those articles, questioned by some 
commentators, is beyond the scope of this Article.242 
                                                                                                             
incurred after the filing of the suit), affirmed after remand, Lamson Petroleum 
Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 843 So. 2d 424, 426 (La. Ct. App. 2002); 
Edmundson Bros., 731 So. 2d at 1064–65 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 
mineral lessees were bad faith possessors under Article 487 from the moment 
mineral lessor filed suit to cancel lease for failure to develop property); Ruth v. 
Buwe, 168 So. 2d 776, 779 (La. 1936) (holding that defendants were bad faith 
possessors under Article 503 (1870) from the moment a petitory action was filed 
against them). 
 238. Wood v. Axis Energy Corp., 899 So. 2d 138, 147 (La. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that continued production under oil and gas lease was in bad faith as of 
the date that the lessors made first written demand for release of the lease for 
failure to produce in paying quantities and thus interest holder became responsible 
for production expenses thereafter under Articles 487 and 488); Edmundson 
Bros., 731 So. 2d at 1064–65 (holding that mineral lessees were bad faith 
possessors after lease expired under Article 487 and they were not entitled to 
Article 488 production expenses because they should have known that lease 
would expire 90 days after production ceased). 
 239. Ruth, 168 So. 2d at 778.  
 240. See V&S Planting Co. v. Red River Waterway Comm’n, 472 So. 2d 331, 336 
(La. Ct. App. 1985) (referring to LA. CIV. CODE arts. 493, 493.1, 493.2, and 495). 
 241. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (providing detailed default rules for rights 
and obligations of parties to a lease, upon its termination, with regard to 
attachments, additions, or other improvements to the leased thing). 
 242. For criticism of the entire secondary accession rights regime in the Civil 
Code, including especially Articles 493 and 495, see Symeon Symeonides, 
Developments in the Law, Property, 47 LA. L. REV. 429, 451 (1986). For a defense 
of those articles, see JOHN A. LOVETT ET AL., LOUISIANA PROPERTY LAW, THE 
CIVIL CODE, CASES AND COMMENTARY 310–21 (2014). 




In summary, the quick and handy categorization tool represented by 
Article 487’s definition of good faith greatly enhances the utility in solving 
myriad resource allocation problems arising when a principal thing yields 
an accessory thing through the work of someone other than the owner of 
the principal thing or when some accessory object is placed on land 
belonging to another. A good faith possessor must possess by virtue of 
some act translative of ownership and must subjectively believe that she 
actually was the owner of the principal thing she possessed. But by 
keeping the good faith accession inquiry limited to these two relatively 
simple factual determinations, generally eschewing complex and 
contextualized evaluations of carefulness, and cutting off good faith at the 
moment defects in title become readily known to the possessor, the revised 
Civil Code generally has preserved the efficiency of Louisiana’s accession 
regime, even as the demands placed upon it in an era of extensive mineral 
and timber exploitation have increased.243 
IV. ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION WITH RESPECT TO IMMOVABLES 
In 1982, the Louisiana Legislature turned its attention to the last major 
source of good faith in Louisiana property law examined in this Article—
ten-year acquisitive prescription with respect to immovables.244 As argued 
elsewhere,245 the preservation of a two-tiered, French-inspired model for 
acquisitive prescription of immovable property represents one of the most 
important features of Louisiana’s property law system. Under that system, 
a possessor with good faith and just title can acquire ownership or other real 
rights in an immovable in just ten years,246 whereas a possessor without 
either good faith or just title must possess continuously for 30 years to 
acquire ownership or other real rights by acquisitive prescription.247 
Although a detailed examination of how all the requisites of ten-year 
acquisitive prescription function is beyond the scope of this Article, five 
crucial characteristics mark prescriptive good faith in Louisiana law. 
                                                                                                             
 243. Louisiana’s timber piracy statute provides for heavy penalties to be 
assessed against a person who unlawfully cuts or removes trees belonging to 
another person but provides some relief for a good faith violator of the statute. 
LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1(C)–(E) (2018). For commentary, see Mirais M. 
Holden, Timber Piracy, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent: The 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision in Sullivan v. Wallace, 21 SAN JOAQUIN AG. 
L. REV. 103 (2012). 
 244. Act No. 187, § 1, 1982 La. Acts 518. 
 245. Lovett, Precarious Possession, supra note 72, at 624–45. 
 246. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3473, 3475. 
 247. Id. art. 3486. 




First, good faith for purposes of ten-year acquisitive prescription is 
distinct from and yet must be accompanied by just title.248 Second, 
beginning decisively with the revision of the Civil Code in 1982 and the 
adoption of revised Articles 3480 and 3481, Louisiana law requires not only 
that a possessor asserting ten-year acquisitive prescription subjectively 
believe he is the owner of the thing he is possessing; it also requires that this 
belief be objectively reasonable under the circumstances.249 This means that 
good faith for purposes of acquisitive prescription of an immovable has two 
explicit components: a subjective and an objective one.250 As discussed 
below, the focus on objective reasonableness is particularly important 
because it requires courts to give much more attention to an acquisitive 
prescription claimant’s carefulness at the time he commenced his possession 
rather than make a simpler determination about the claimant’s subjective 
honesty. 
Third, under the Louisiana Civil Code, good faith is still presumed for 
purposes of acquisitive prescription,251 although recent judicial decisions 
have cast doubt on the viability of other presumptions related to possession 
and prescription.252 Fourth, in tandem with the move toward an objective 
                                                                                                             
 248. As the revision comments note, “for purposes of prescription, good faith 
and just title are separate ideas, whereas for purposes of accession, the two ideas 
are blended.” Id. art. 3480 cmt. b. The same is true with respect to three-year 
acquisitive prescription with respect to movables. Id. art. 3490. But as the revision 
comments to Article 3490 note, the requirement of just title is easily satisfied 
because for the transfer of movables there is no requirement that title be written 
or recorded. Art. 3490 cmt. b. 
 249. Art. 3480 (“For purposes of acquisitive prescription, a possessor is in 
good faith when he reasonably believes, in light of objective considerations, that 
he is owner of the thing he possesses.”); id. art. 3481 (“Good faith is presumed . . 
. . This presumption is rebutted on proof that the possessor knows, or should know, 
that he is not the owner of the thing he possesses.”). This clarification must count 
as one of the more significant improvements in the law of acquisitive prescription 
accomplished by the Louisiana State Law Institute under the leadership of 
Professor Yiannopoulos. The provisions of the 1870 Civil Code that were 
replaced were didactic and vague. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3451–52 (1870).  
 250. Art. 3480 cmt. c (emphasizing that the revised article rejects previous 
jurisprudence holding that good faith only required subjective belief of the 
possessor that he owned the thing and importing objective reasonableness test into 
good faith analysis). 
   251. Art. 3481. The first sentence of Article 3481 merely restates the same 
numbered article of the 1870 Civil Code. Id. cmt. a. 
 252. See Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015) (holding that 
one neighbor who engages in acts of quasi-possession on a road or path crossing 
his neighbor’s property is presumed to be possessing with the implied consent or 




conception of good faith, the 1982 revision clarified that neither error of 
law nor error of fact defeats the presumption of good faith.253 Of course, 
errors in judgment about the applicable law and misunderstandings of fact 
might, in combination with other objective facts, provide a basis for a 
record owner to rebut a prescription claimant’s presumed good faith. 
Finally, unlike with accession, good faith for purposes of acquisitive 
prescription, though measured immediately, remains temporally 
boundless.254 If a prescription claimant has an objectively reasonable 
belief that he is the owner at the commencement of his possession, the 
Civil Code explicitly provides that “subsequent bad faith does not prevent 
the accrual of prescription of ten years.”255 Consequently, good faith 
status, once acquired by the prescription claimant, continues to benefit the 
possessor even when the veil of subjective belief in his ownership has been 
shattered by events or becomes objectively untenable.256 
Several important themes have emerged from post-1982 revision 
caselaw applying these principles. First, Louisiana courts have regularly 
held that a ten-year acquisitive prescription claimant can prevail and prove 
his good faith relying in part on the presumption of good faith stated in 
Article 3482 even though he never conducted a title examination prior to 
taking possession of the subject immovable.257 On the one hand, this 
                                                                                                             
acquiescence of the neighbor, and thus, his quasi-possession is presumed to be 
precarious), discussed at length in Lovett, Precarious Possession, supra note 72. 
 253. Art. 3481. The revision comments elaborate on this point, noting that 
revised Article 3481 “overrules legislatively the doctrine of legal bad faith,” that 
is, the notion that an error of law could defeat good faith. Art. 3481 cmt. c. For 
detailed discussion of this change, see Symeonides, supra note 242. 
 254. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3482. 
 255. Id. As the revision comments note, this rule is widespread in civil law 
systems. Id. cmt. b. 
 256. The major exception to this rule occurs in the context of tacking, in which 
the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a ten-year acquisitive prescription 
claimant seeking to cumulate his possession with that of a predecessor by 
particular title must prove that both he and his predecessor commenced their 
respective possessions in good faith. Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 587 (La. 
1982), discussed in John A. Lovett, Tacking in a Mixed Jurisdiction, in ESSAYS 
IN HONOUR OF GEORGE GRETTON 162–76 (Andrew Steven ed., 2017). 
 257. Cantrelle v. Gaude, 700 So. 2d 523, 528–29 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that prescription claimants were in good faith even though no title examination 
was made either by claimants or their predecessor, the mother and mother-in-law 
of the claimants, and predecessor acquired property by quitclaim deed); Mai v. 
Floyd, 951 So. 2d 244, 247 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that claimant was in good 
faith, explicitly noting that “the fact that no parties, prior to [subsequent 
prospective purchaser], conducted a title examination, which would have revealed 




interpretation should not be surprising because one of the revision 
comments to Article 3480 explicitly stated that “an acquirer of immovable 
property is not charged with constructive knowledge of the public records, 
nor is he bound to search the public records in order to ascertain 
ownership.”258 
On the other hand, the resilience of this position is somewhat surprising 
given the ubiquity of title examination in contemporary conveyancing 
practice, the frequency with which title insurance is obtained in connection 
with the acquisition and financing of real estate transactions, and calls by 
prominent commentators for a change in the law to make the presence of a 
title examination, if not an outright requirement, at least a significant factor 
weighing in favor of good faith.259 Perhaps one explanation for Louisiana 
courts’ refusal to make title examination an explicit requirement for good 
faith in the context of acquisitive prescription can be found in related areas 
of the law. For instance, there is a jurisprudential rule that a buyer asserting 
the warranty against eviction against a seller of immovable property is not 
required to conduct a title examination either.260 Alternatively, the 
leniency of Louisiana courts on this point may just reflect a practical 
understanding that in many parts of the state real estate transactions still 
regularly occur without the benefit of title examinations.  
The second important theme does not concern the failure to conduct a 
title examination but concerns the consequences of having performed one. 
In the landmark case Phillips v. Parker, the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that the Louisiana public records doctrine has no bearing on the analysis 
of whether a ten-year prescription claimant is in good faith.261 That holding 
                                                                                                             
the 1986 tax sale, does not create bad faith,” but also noting that the claimant 
testified that he and his transferor visited tax assessor’s office prior to claimant’s 
purchase of property and “[were] told no taxes were due prior to his purchase”); 
Ponder v. Jenkins, 468 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that “[a] 
purchaser will not be charged with bad faith because a title examination, if made, 
would have disclosed defects in the seller’s title” and holding claimant was thus 
in good faith, despite lack of title examination, in the absence of any other 
evidence challenging presumed good faith). 
 258. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3480 cmt. d. 
 259. Symeonides, supra note 242, at 439–41.  
 260. See Richmond v. Zapata Dev. Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 978 (La. 1977) 
(“Because the registry laws are only intended as notice to third parties and have 
no application whatever between parties to a contract, a vendee is under no 
obligation to search the record in order to ascertain what his vendor has sold and 
what it has not, and the vendor is entitled, as between himself and his vendor, to 
rely upon the deed as written.”). 
 261. Phillips v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972, 976 (La. 1986) (“The law of registry is 
not involved in any way with the theory of acquisitive prescription that a party who 




meant that the mere availability of relevant information in the public 
records revealing a conflicting claim or interest does not, without other 
available indicia of a potential title defect, destroy good faith. 
Just as important, the court in Phillips also established that when an 
acquirer of immovable property does conduct a title examination, that 
action does not impart constructive knowledge of every fact ascertainable 
in the public records so as to destroy the claimant’s good faith.262 As a 
result, the prescription claimants in that case, the Parkers, prevailed on 
their ten-year acquisitive prescription defense in a boundary action even 
though they had conducted a title examination prior to the transaction by 
which they acquired their property.263 As Justice Lemmon’s majority 
opinion explained, a rule imparting constructive knowledge to claimants 
like the Parkers, who had hired an attorney and reasonably relied on that 
attorney’s analysis of a survey and a title abstract, would have been not 
only grossly unfair to the Parkers264 but potentially disastrous for 
Louisiana property law.265 
                                                                                                             
reasonably believed he was acquiring valid title should be deemed to have a valid 
title after a certain period of possession in which the owner failed to object.”). 
 262. Id. at 977–78. As the court noted, imputed knowledge is a completely 
different matter. If the Parkers’ title examiner or attorney had discovered the 
defect in their vendor’s title and had disclosed it to them, or even if they had 
discovered the defect and failed to disclose it to them, they would be bound by 
that information and their good faith would have evaporated. Id. at 978. 
 263. Id. at 978–79. In Phillips, the Parkers had built a fence that encroached 
on their neighbor’s property in reliance on the property description found in their 
deed, but, as it turned out, the Parkers’ property description was erroneously 
drawn because the plaintiff, Phillips, actually owned the additional strip of land 
that was mistakenly included in the Parkers’ deed. Id. at 973–74, 979. 
 264. Id. at 979. The mistake made by the Parker’s attorney in Phillips was, 
indeed, easy to make. The Parkers’ advising attorney or the underlying title 
examiner hired by the attorney either failed to find an August 1955 deed conveying 
a lot from a common author to the Phillips’ predecessors in interest, the McCullers, 
which had been recorded just a few months prior to the Parkers’ acquisition of their 
lot in an exchange which itself cured a previous conveyancing error, or they failed 
to compare the measurements in the McCullers’ property description with the 
survey of the property that the Parkers’ intended to purchase. Id. at 974 n.2. 
 265. As every Louisiana property law student should learn, a contrary ruling 
would have made ten-year acquisitive prescription unavailable for any claimant 
who had conducted a title examination because all prior conflicting interests of a 
record owner are, by definition, recorded. Id. at 977. Meanwhile, ten-year 
acquisitive prescription would have remained within reach for possessors who 
never bothered to conduct a title examination in the first place, thus “penalizing a 
purchaser who employs a title examiner and rewarding one who doesn’t.” Id. 
Remarkably, the intermediate appellate court in Phillips had reached precisely such 




By clarifying the impact of title examination in relation to good faith, 
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Phillips avoided massive 
confusion and demoralization costs and obviated the need for legislative 
action to save the institution of ten-year acquisitive prescription from 
unintended destruction. In short, the decision in Phillips protected 
reasonably careful purchasers and acquirers of immovable property and 
removed any incentive to act with intentional carelessness. 
The third important theme of Louisiana courts interpreting the good 
faith requirement for ten-year acquisitive prescription after the 1982 
revision concerns the wide scope of relevant good faith inquiries and the 
resulting wide variability of outcomes in reported decisions. In rejecting a 
per se rule requiring title examinations but signaling that such an 
examination and the knowledge gained from one can be “factors” in a 
good faith analysis,266 the Supreme Court in Phillips made clear that the 
1982 revision requires “a consideration of all of the factors of the 
particular case relevant to the definition of good faith . . . .”267 Picking up 
on this notion, Professor, and later Dean, Symeonides sought to give some 
specificity to the factors that might be included in such a contingent, ad 
hoc approach when he recommended that 
[t]he possessor’s actual good or bad faith should be determined, 
not by artificial fictions, but rather by evaluating, on a case by case 
basis, all of the surrounding circumstances, including the 
condition of the public records, the thoroughness of the particular 
title search, the competence and reputation of the title examiner, 
the type of title defect involved, the possibility of it being missed, 
and other similar factors.268 
In subsequent cases, Louisiana courts accepted the invitation jointly 
extended by Phillips and Symeonides and have considered a wide spectrum 
of personal, geographic, and transactional facts and circumstances in 
making good faith determinations in the context of ten-year prescription 
claims. 
In some cases, courts use the tools of Articles 3480, 3481, and 3482 
to reject claims of ten-year prescription claimants, usually focusing on the 
objective unreasonableness of the claimant’s belief and on evidence of 
                                                                                                             
a perverse result. Id. at 974–75 (explaining Phillips v. Parker, 469 So. 2d 1102 (La. 
Ct. App. 1985)). 
 266. Id. at 977 n.7. 
 267. Id. at 977. 
 268. Symeonides, supra note 242, at 440–41. In his view, this ad hoc approach 
was “essentially the supreme court’s approach in Phillips.” Id. 




subjective disbelief. In one instance, a court held that the third wife of a 
deceased Louisiana man did not possess four Jefferson Parish lots that her 
husband purportedly transferred to her in good faith because at the time of 
those transfers she knew or should have known that her husband was, in 
fact, still legally married to his Mississippi common law wife and thus did 
not have the authority to transfer the property without her consent.269 In 
another case, a court held that the possessors of a portion of a lot adjacent 
to the Shreve Island Cut Off in Caddo Parish were not good faith 
possessors because they had long harbored doubts about the extent of their 
ownership of the land, and the majority of the land at issue was covered 
by a lake produced by a dramatic avulsive event that took place on the Red 
River in 1930.270 
But in other cases, ten-year prescription claimants prevail, often with 
an assist from the powerful presumption of good faith. In one case, a court 
held that the succession of a family that had possessed some De Soto 
Parish residential property for more than ten years had proved good faith 
based on a voluminous body of evidence all tending to reinforce the 
conclusion that the family members reasonably believed they owned the 
property in question.271 That evidence included two deeds purporting to 
transfer the property, photographs, utility payments, tax assessments, 
homestead exemption records, home improvement contracts, and even a 
deceased parent’s death certificate.272 Finally, in a recent decision, the 
Louisiana Fifth Circuit affirmed a civil jury’s determination that the 
second wife of a successful New Orleans businessman was in good faith 
when her husband purported to transfer to her his deceased first wife’s 
50% interest in the valuable home he had acquired as community property 
with his first wife.273 There, the court found good faith despite testimony 
indicating not only some possibility of subjective knowledge of her 
                                                                                                             
 269. In re Succession of Hendrix, 990 So. 2d 742, 749–50 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
Facts of particular relevance included the claimant’s false statements on the acts 
of transfer that she was the transferor’s wife when, in fact, the couple was not yet 
married; the claimant’s knowledge of the previous common law wife and a son 
born of the common law marriage; and the claimant’s knowledge that the son had 
written his father expressing an interest in meeting him. Id. at 750. 
 270. Hamel’s Farm, L.L.C. v. Muslow, 988 So. 2d 882, 894 (La. Ct. App. 
2008). Avulsion generally refers to a sudden action of a river or stream that carries 
away an identifiable piece of riparian land and attaches it to other riparian lands 
on the same or opposite side of the river or stream. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 502 
(2018); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 91, § 4:15, at 172.  
 271. Heirs of Morris v. Simpson, 987 So. 2d 659, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Legardeur v. Coleman, 131 So. 3d 1305, 1042–44 (La. Ct. App. 2013).  




stepchildren’s interest in the former community property asset but also 
some unusual family circumstances that might have caused a reasonable 
acquirer to have doubts about her husband’s authority to make such a 
transfer.274 
Of course, in many other intriguing decisions Louisiana courts have 
evaluated the factors relevant to good faith in the context of ten-year 
acquisitive prescription and reached generally defensible conclusions.275 
A similar kind of analysis takes place when courts examine claims of 
                                                                                                             
 274. In Legardeur, the jury apparently credited the wife’s testimony that (1) 
she always believed her husband wanted her to have the house; (2) her husband 
had transferred the house to her as a gift; and (3) no one informed her of the 50% 
interest of her husband’s children from his previous marriage. Id. at 1043. The 
jury apparently discounted the stepchildren’s testimony about a family meeting at 
the subject home at which they allegedly informed the second wife of their 50% 
interest in the home prior to their father’s transfer. Id. The court of appeal refused 
to overturn the jury’s credibility determination under a manifest error standard of 
review. Id. at 1044. After her husband’s death, the second wife eventually sold 
the house for $1,150,000, and as a result of her successful ten-year acquisitive 
prescription defense, she kept all of the proceeds. Id. at 1039. 
 275. See, e.g., City of Shreveport v. Noel Estate, Inc., 941 So. 2d 66, 80–81 (La. 
Ct. App. 2006) (finding claimant was in good faith in light of opponent’s failure to 
introduce any evidence to demonstrate knowledge of defects in 1972 deed other 
than vague and unsupported allegations that consideration paid was inadequate; 
non-warranty deed to possessor was insufficient to preclude good faith); Cockerham 
v. Cockerham, 16 So. 3d 1264, 1268 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (finding claimant to be in 
bad faith because the 1963 cash deed to predecessor upon which claimant relied did 
not reflect how transferor acquired the interests of multiple co-owners he purported 
to convey, there was no other evidence suggesting transferor had anything to 
convey, and transferee, having received a 3/24 interest ten years earlier, should have 
known transferor did not own the property he was attempting to convey); Lallande 
v. Verret, 21 So. 3d 444, 446–47 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming trial court finding 
that claimant who acquired property via sheriff’s sale was in good faith; information 
supplied by foreclosing bank included plat listing triangular portion of lot as part of 
lot being sold); Lemoine v. Downs, 58 So. 3d 659, 662–63 (La. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding husband’s attempt to revoke unilaterally the donation of immovable 
property to his minor son was an insufficient basis for wife’s assertion of good faith; 
the fact that the wife witnessed attempted revocation only revealed she was aware 
of original donation, which was only a relative nullity and only subject to challenge 
by son); EOG Res., Inc. v. Hopkins, 131 So. 3d 72, 84 (La. Ct. App. 2013) 
(affirming trial court finding that claimant commenced possession in good faith 
based on warranty deeds but also affirming trial court finding that claimant did show 
exclusive possession for ten years in light of discredited testimony regarding fence). 




three-year acquisitive prescription with respect to valuable movables.276 
What remains universally distinctive about all of these decisions, however, 
is the relatively microscopic level of analysis and the focus on objective 
reasonableness in light of all relevant circumstances. When the stakes are 
high, as they are in claims of ten-year acquisitive prescription with respect 
to immovables,277 the courts engage in relatively rigorous scrutiny, 
carefully searching for evidence of actual honesty and reasonable 
carefulness in the circumstances, even though possessors presumptively 
possess in good faith. 
CONCLUSION: PROPERTY LAW WITHOUT GOOD FAITH 
To fully appreciate the importance of good faith in Louisiana property 
law, it is useful to consider what Louisiana property law would look like 
if good faith were banished from all of the areas just examined. In general, 
property law might gain something in terms of certainty and predictability, 
but those gains would likely be outweighed by other social costs, 
particularly as property disputes would produce increasingly binary 
outcomes and parties likely would over-invest in risk-reduction measures 
to guard against unhappy results. In addition, the role of lawyers in 
property law could well diminish while other professionals and even 
computer programs might become more important.278 
                                                                                                             
 276. See Succession of Wagner, 993 So. 2d 709, 722–23 (La. Ct. App. 2008) 
(affirming trial court finding that son failed to prove good faith in claim of three-
year acquisitive prescription with respect to $450,000 worth of gold coins based 
on detailed analysis of son’s knowledge that coins were purchased with check 
drawn on community checking account and his attempt to conceal his father’s 
donation of coins to him without mother’s consent); Succession of Moore, 737 
So. 2d 749, 754–55 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that nephew was a bad faith 
possessor of family heirlooms because nephew took heirlooms after his aunt, 
suffering from senility, was placed in nursing home and therefore nephew could 
acquire ownership only by ten-year acquisitive prescription for movables). 
 277. Of course, in some boundary disputes the amount of immovable property 
claimed by ten-year acquisitive prescription may be relatively small, but because 
ownership shifts without any requirement of compensation, the stakes of these 
cases are still high, at least as compared to encroaching building and accession 
cases. In some boundary disputes, though, the amount of immovable property in 
dispute can be quite large. See Loutre Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 63 So. 3d 
120 (La. 2011) (applying boundary tacking to resolve dispute over 15 acre tract). 
 278. As Hanoch Dagan has reminded the Author, this development should be 
irrelevant to the objective legal reformer or theorist, but certainly lawyers and at 
least some law professors would regret it. 




Consider the subject of encroaching building servitudes. It is hard to 
imagine how this relatively new legal institution would survive in the 
absence of a good faith requirement. If the institution fell, property owners 
who mistakenly constructed buildings on their neighbors’ property or 
acquired such buildings would probably be faced with the choice of either 
tearing down the encroaching part of the buildings, paying exorbitantly to 
acquire small strips of land, or trying to prove 30-year acquisitive 
prescription if the encroachments were old enough.279 Perhaps surveyors, 
aided by GPS technology, would benefit prospectively as property owners 
learned to take greater care when starting construction projects, but the 
role of lawyers in sorting out these problems would diminish over time. 
It is also hard to see how the bona fide purchaser doctrine would 
continue to function as currently designed without good faith as the crucial 
rule of decision in these kinds of disputes. If good faith was suppressed as 
the key analytical factor, Louisiana would need some other rule or standard 
to help courts decide whether to protect the security of title of an original 
owner of a corporeal movable or protect the interests of an eventual 
transferee. In the absence of such a rule or standard, the legal system would 
have to choose one of the two positions to favor in disputes of this nature. 
And indeed, if Louisiana chose to protect only one of these positions with a 
clear rule, that choice would likely increase social costs—more wasteful 
investment in security measures for original owners or much more 
investment in examining the provenance of vendors’ claims of ownership 
for third-party purchasers of movables. Insurance costs on both sides of the 
equation might well rise in response. By adopting a good faith analysis that 
favors the eventual transferee, especially when that transferee acquires the 
movable in a relatively normal market transaction, Louisiana has, in effect, 
created a rule-like standard that smooths market transactions yet leaves open 
the possibility for a true owner to protect his security of title when unusual 
circumstances should have made the transferee suspicious. 
If Louisiana did not distinguish between good and bad faith possessors 
in accession, the accession regime likely would rely on either over/under-
inclusive unjust enrichment remedies, if such remedies could even be 
asserted. If the law did not allow the relatively quick and ready good-
versus-bad-faith determinations in this area, Louisiana most likely would 
revert to the least common denominator and treat all possessors in the 
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same manner as current bad faith possessors. Hence, possessors of land 
would be limited to claims for production expenses in connection with 
production of fruits,280 barred from any restitutionary remedy in cases of 
extraction of products,281 and relegated to claims for reimbursement in 
connection with major improvements only when owners elected to keep 
inseparable improvements that added value to the underlying immovable 
while exposing them to liability if the owner did not want an improvement 
to remain on the immovable.282 Moreover, in this monochromatic 
accession regime, accession disputes essentially would turn into 
accounting challenges and would involve little or no legal judgment. 
Lawyers would hand over the reins to accountants and appraisers. 
Finally, and most dramatically of all, if Louisiana eliminated the 
consideration of good faith from acquisitive prescription, it would face a 
difficult choice. If it wanted to preserve a shorter acquisitive prescription 
period for purposes of clearing title in cases involving innocent 
conveyancing mistakes, it likely would have to establish a number of other 
specific criteria for a claimant to satisfy. Those criteria might be objective, 
but they could lead to over/under-inclusive results. Alternatively, if 
Louisiana chose to settle on just one time period for all claims of 
acquisitive prescription, Louisiana would have to select between a ten-
year—or perhaps an even shorter—prescriptive period, the long 30-year 
period currently used for possessors in bad faith or without just title, or 
perhaps split the difference and set the prescriptive period at some 
middling duration. If a short period was employed, Louisiana might 
reward bad faith possessors too easily and too quickly, thus eliminating 
incentives for parties engaged in real estate transactions to take reasonable 
precautions and act carefully.283  
On the other hand, if a lengthy period was chosen, innocent 
conveyancing mistakes would be much more difficult to repair. Title 
examination would become even more important but also would become 
more costly and time-consuming because the consequences of a mistake 
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 283. Two prominent property law scholars have made a similar point, arguing 
that from a property law design perspective, affording good faith possessors 
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would be much higher. Assuming a longer time period was employed, 
acquisitive prescription could still fix ancient mistakes and could continue 
to align very long-term possessory facts on the ground with record title but 
only if recent developments with regard to precarious possession in this area 
does not otherwise erode the transformative power of acquisitive 
prescription more generally.284 Again, the role of the property litigator in 
this area would shrink while the role of the title examiner and title abstractor 
would grow in importance. This course is not without precedent in mixed 
jurisdictions,285 but it would be a significant departure for Louisiana law. 
This concluding sketch is admittedly speculative. Although property 
law without good faith might become more predictable and more certain 
in some respects, perhaps other unimaginable uncertainties—those 
problematic “unknown unknowns”—would soon appear.286 As the 
preceding discussion makes clear, this author prefers a property law 
system in which good faith plays an important role—at least in the four 
areas discussed above. The meandering and oscillating currents of good 
faith in the revised Civil Code give Louisiana’s property law system 
several great advantages—a penchant for flexible, contextualized decision 
making; a responsiveness to ethical norms; and a strong regard for the 
interests of others—all qualities that tend to lend stability to the system in 
the long run. 
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 285. In Scotland, by contrast, positive—that is, acquisitive—prescription of real 
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